Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 33, Issue 2

2009

Article 5

Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In
Need of More Transparency, More Access,
and More Time
Matthew J. Wilson∗

∗

Copyright c 2009 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In
Need of More Transparency, More Access,
and More Time
Matthew J. Wilson

Abstract
The lay judge system has considerable potential both in concept and form. To realize its full
potential, the system needs to overcome various structural impediments and cultural challenges.
This Article further contributes to the emerging discussion by detailing three related areas that
merit attention and reform if the system is going to realize its full potential. Namely, the lay judge
system would benefit from 1) increased transparency by eliminating punitive measures against
citizen judges desiring to freely speak about the trial proceedings or deliberation process oncle
the trial is complete; 2) impoved access to the interrogation of detained suspects and defendants;
and 3) limited victim participation in trials until a post-verdicgt phase in the proceedings. Part
I establishes a foundation by outlining the movement towards citizen participation, the reasons
underlying the new lay judge system, and the ongoing debate about the law judge system. Part II
details the development of the Japanese criminal system. Part III explains the need for increased
transparency in the deliberation room, improved access to interrogations, and controls necessary
to ensure objective deliberations.

JAPAN'S NEW CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL SYSTEM: IN
NEED OF MORE TRANSPARENCY, MORE ACCESS,
AND MORE TIME
Matthewj Wilson*
INTRODUCTION
When the murder trial of seventy-two year-old Katsuyoshi
Fujii commenced in the Tokyo District Court in early August
2009, thousands of Japanese lined up for the opportunity to
witness the trial.' Millions more were showered with seemingly
non-stop television coverage of this monumental event. 2 This
marked the first time that the Japanese public had paid such
close attention to the minute details of the criminal justice
process. 3 Interestingly, the fanfare underlying this widespread
national interest did not specifically relate to Mr. Fujii or his
heinous acts. Rather, the entire nation focused its eyes on the
groundbreaking participation of citizen jurors in his criminal
4
trial.
For over sixty years, meaningful public participation in
criminal or civil trials was an abstract concept in Japan. This
* Associate Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law.
1. See Home Issues Top Lay Judge Trials/Focus Shifting to Sentences as 1st Cases go to
Court in Early August, DAILYYOMIURI (Japan) ,June 23, 2009 [hereinafter Home Issues Top
Lay Judge Trials], available at 2009 WLNR 11928120; David T. Johnson, Early Returns from
Japan's New Criminal Trials, ASIA-PAC. J., Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.japanfocus.org/
-davidt.-johnson/3212; Leo Lewis, Juries Return to JapaneseJustice in Katsuyoshi Fujii
Trial, TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
to
Raw
Japan,
Posting
of
Isabel
Reynolds
asia/article6737305.ece;
http://blogs.reuters.com/japan/ (Jun 18, 2009, 05:13 EDT). Katsuyoshi Fujii was
accused of stabbing an elderly neighbor in Tokyo. He confessed to the murder and was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Trial by Jury in Japan: Hanging in the Balance,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 38 [hereinafter Hangingin the Balance].
2. While living in Tokyo, the author witnessed the comprehensive television and
print media coverage given to the relatively simple trial of Mr. Fujii. Notably, Mr. Fujii
did not contest his guilt in the matter. Lewis, supra note 1. Instead, he challenged the
sentence that was recommended by the prosecution. Id.
3. See Setsuko Kamiya, Citizens Stepped up, Fulfilled New Court Duty, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090807a4.html (quoting
Professor Akira Goto of Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law).
4. Lewis, supra note 1.
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drastically changed with Mr. Fujii's trial. Japan recently initiated
revolutionary changes to its legal system as part of a sweeping
reform effort aimed at addressing its mid-1990s economic slump
and its desire to play a greater role in global affairs. One of the
most significant and well-publicized legal reforms was the
adoption of a "saiban-in seido," which translates as "lay assessor
system" or "lay judge system," 5 in which registered voters are
conscripted to serve on a mixed quasi-jury tribunal together with
professional judges. 6 This monumental change and other
significant reforms have not only affected the judicial process
itself, but have also impacted Japanese society.
On May 21, 2009, Japan revived citizen participation in
serious criminal trials pursuant to the "Saiban-in Ho," or Act
Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials
("Lay Judge Act").7 Although citizen involvement in the judicial
process is standard in most developed nations,8 Japan was until
now the only Group of Eight nation without a system that allows
citizens to participate in criminal trials. 9 For nearly seven
decades, the Japanese judicial system has been the exclusive
domain of legal professionals. Since 1943, professional judges
presided over all criminal trials at the district court and appellate
5. For the purpose of consistency, this Article will generally refer to the new system
as "layjudge system."
6. See Chana R. Schoenberger, Challenges Abound ForJapan's New Lay Judges,
FORBES,
June
16,
2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/16/
japanlay-judges-markets-equities-asia.html. The term "saiban-in seido" has been subject to
a variety of translations including: lay assessor system, lay judge system, citizen judge
system, quasi-jury system, or even jury system. See id.
7. See Saiban'in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru h6ritsu [Act Concerning
Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004 [hereinafter Lay
Judge Act], translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan's Quasi Jury (Saiban-in)
Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act ConcerningParticipationof Lay Assessors in Criminal
Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY'J. 9, 9 (2005); see alsoJohnson, supra note 1 (outlining the
Lay Judge Act and discussing the effect on the Japanese public, judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys and others).
8. Jury service is well established internationally. Over seventy jurisdictions, such as
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States have jury systems. See, e.g., Kang Ji-Sun, Civil ParticipationSystem: A MajorJudicial
Reform Allowing Public Participation in Court, YONSEI ANNALS (Japan), July 12, 2009,
http://annals.yonsei.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=595. On January 1, 2008, the
Republic of Korea also introduced citizen participation in criminal trials. Id. February
12, 2008, marked the first jury trial in Korea in the Daegu District Court. Id. The Korean
government hopes to perfect the system by 2012. Id.
9. Lay Judge System Starts in Japanamid Lingering Concerns,THAI PRESS REPS., May 25,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9772569.
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levels. 10 During this period, the Japanese judiciary has been
generally regarded as intelligent, competent, consistent, and
hard working. 11 Notwithstanding, there were some serious
criticisms regarding poor fact-finding and an over reliance on
prosecutors.12 During this period, citizen participation in the
judicial process was extremely limited and only manifest in
largely unknown prosecutorial review commissions.1 3 With Mr.
Fujii's trial officially kicking off the new lay judge system, Japan
opened a new chapter in criminal jurisprudence and civic
participation. Japan's new lay judge system will not only be
closely scrutinized on a domestic scale, but it may also offer
valuable lessons on an international scale to established and
emerging democracies, both in its initial form and in subsequent
iterations.
Much excitement and fanfare have accompanied the lay
judge system. Japan's investment of time, energy, and financial
resources in preparing for citizen participation in the lay judge

10. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, JFBA AND JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 4 (2008),
available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/data/JFBABrochure_2008.pdf.
Japan did, however, utilize jury trials in its past. Under the Meiji Constitution of Japan,
jury trials were held in criminal cases between 1928 and 1943. See Matthew Wilson, The
Dawn of Criminal Trials in Japan: Success on the Horizon?, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 835, 840
(2007). Japan held fewer than five hundred jury trials during this period, though,
primarily because the risks to a defendant were quite high-including the inability to
appeal a jury verdict. See Kanako Ida, Introducing Citizen Participationin Japanese Courts:
Interaction with Society and Democracyfrom the Perspective of the American Jury System 7 (USJP
Occasional Paper 06-03, 2006), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/us-japan/
research/pdf/06-03.Ida.pdf.
11. Wilson, supra note 10, at 836-37.
12. See, e.g., Ingram Weber, The New JapaneseJury System: Empowering the Public,
Preserving ContinentalJustice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 149 (2009); see also John 0. Haley,
Litigation in Japan:A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WILLAMETrEJ. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL.
121,139 (2002).
13. Albeit unknown to most, Japanese citizens have participated in the criminal
justice system for over sixty years in the context of Kensatsu Shinsakai, or Prosecutorial
Review Commissions ("PRC"). See Hiroshi Fukurai, The Re-birth ofJapan's PetitLay Judge
and Grand Jury Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay
ParticipatoryExperience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 315, 323-28 (2007).
The PRC reviewed the propriety of a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute certain
suspects upon request from a victim or party of interest. Id. at 323-24. If the PRC
disagreed with the prosecutor's inaction, then the PRC issued a recommendation to
reconsider its decision not to prosecute. Id. at 324. Because these recommendations
were not binding, prosecutors only modified their initial decision less than ten percent
of the time. Id. at 325. On May 28, 2004, the Diet enacted legislation that makes these
recommendations binding. Id.

490

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:487

system has been phenomenal. 4 As the implementation date for
the lay judge system approached, debate and speculation about
the merits of this epic change to Japanese justice and society
increased considerably. 15 Optimists see the new system as a
vehicle for fostering positive societal change and bringing
transparency to Japan's sheltered and oft-criticized criminal
justice system. 16 Conversely, others strongly believe that the
system was never broken, and should not be touched by common
citizens who are inexperienced and generally uneducated in the
complexities of the law. 17 Some even advocated that the lay judge
8
system should be postponed, or even completely scrapped.'
The lay judge system has considerable potential both in
concept and form. To realize its full potential, the system needs
to overcome various structural impediments and cultural
challenges. Interested parties and observers in Japan and abroad,
including this author, have expressed concerns about the
obstacles facing the lay judge system and have suggested methods
of reform. 19 This Article further contributes to the emerging
discussion by detailing three related areas that merit attention
and reform if the system is going to realize its full potential.
If the new lay judge system is going to achieve the
pronounced objectives of transparency, public education,
enhanced credibility of the criminal justice system, and reliability
14. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 46, 56-59 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Masami Ito, Lawmakers Question 'Saibanin' System, JAPAN TIMES, May 22,
2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090522a9.html.
19. Wilson, supra note 10; see, e.g., Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation
in the JapaneseJustice System: A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System
(Saiban-in Seido)from Domestic HistoricalandInternationalPsychologicalPerspective, 37 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 935 (2004); Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials inJapan, 28 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 35, 62-64 (2006); Fukurai, supra note 13 at 341-44; Ida, supra note 10 at
36-43; Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the CriminalJury in Japan,62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261
(1999); Stephan Landsman & Jing Zhang, A Tale of Two Juries: Lay ParticipationComes to
Japanese and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 179, 190-97 (2008); Douglas G.
Levin, Saiban-in-seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of Power Underlying Japan's
ProposedLay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 199 (2008);
Arne Soldwedel, Testing Japan's Convictions: The Lay Judge System and Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1417, 1454-55 (2008); Stephen C. Thaman,
Japan's New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions Regarding Their Future Form and
Procedures, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89 (2003); Weber, supra
note 12.
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with respect to the preservation of rights, then Japan needs to
turn its attention to several additional reforms. Namely, the lay
judge system would benefit from (1) increased transparency by
eliminating punitive measures against citizen judges desiring to
freely speak about the trial proceedings or deliberation process
once the trial is complete; (2) improved access to the
interrogation of detained suspects and defendants; and (3)
limited victim participation in trials until a post-verdict phase in
the proceedings.
This Article analyzes how these three important issues
impact the lay judge system and explores potential solutions to
them. More specifically, Part I establishes a foundation by
outlining the movement towards citizen participation, the
reasons underlying the lay judge system, and the ongoing debate
about the new lay judge system. Part II details the development of
the Japanese criminal justice system. It also describes the recent
systemic reforms and benefits of increased citizen participation.
Finally, Part III explains the need for increased transparency in
the deliberation room, improved access to interrogations, and
controls necessary to ensure objective deliberations. Unless these
steps are taken, not only will the lay judge system fail to attain its
full potential, butJapanese criminal justice will remain shrouded
in secretive doubt and the rights of the accused will continue to
be endangered. Japan should take these specific measures in
tandem with its scheduled review of the lay judge system in 2012,
if not before.
I.

THE FOUNDATION AND THE DEBATE

Criminal justice involves very high stakes. Concerns related
to community safety, victims' rights, criminal deterrence, and
individual punishment directly compete with the rights, lives, and
reputations of suspected criminals. Even though Japanese courts
have traditionally been the exclusive province of professional
judges and attorneys, various forces have long sought a system
that would permit common citizens to constructively participate
in the judicial process, thereby infusing societal expectations and
norms into the judicial process. 20 For instance, the Japan

20. See Ida, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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Federation of Bar Associations ("JFBA") 21 has actively
campaigned for jury trials since the 1980s, when four men who
confessed under duress were released from death row after
confirmation of their innocence. 22 Despite these efforts, the
government and general public largely ignored calls for jury
trials until the Justice System Reform Council ("JSRC") 23
recommended the integration of citizen participation into the
criminal trial process at the turn of the century.2 4 With little
attention or much public debate, the National Diet, Japan's
bicameral legislature, accepted the JSRC's recommendation and
25
quickly enacted a law providing for lay judge trials.
The introduction of lay judge trials is one of many
revolutionary legal reforms 26 intended to transform Japan from a
society with excessive regulatory control to a global model based
21. It should be noted that membership in the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations ('1JFBA") consists of attorneys, legal professional corporations, and
registered foreign lawyers. See JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10, at 1-2. The
JFBA does not include prosecutors and judges. See id. The pronounced mission of the
JFBA and Japanese attorneys is the protection of fundamental human rights and the
realization of social justice. See id. at 1.
22. See JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, JAPAN'S 'SUBSTITUTE PRISON' SYSTEM SHOCKS
THE WORLD 3 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/
statements/data/daiyo-kangoku.pdf; Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 185-87.
23. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi established the Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingikai, or
Justice System Reform Council ("JSRC"), in 1999 to create official guidelines for the
judicial reforms taking place in Japan. Fukurai, supra note 13, at 321; see also Shih6 seido
kaikaku shingikai secchih6 [Justice System Reform Council Establishment Act], Law No.
68 of 1999, art. 2. The JSRC consisted of thirteen elite members from various political
and economic sectors, including a former chief justice of the Hiroshima high court, a
former chief prosecutor of the Nagoya Public Prosecutor's Office, two members from
the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japanese Association of
Corporative Executives (Keizai Doyukai), the former President of the JFBA, the President
of the Federation of Private Universities, a business professor from a private university, a
popular writer, a vice president of the Rengo labor organization, and the President of the
Federation of Homemakers (Shufuren). Fukurai, supra note 13, at 321.
24. See Ida, supra note 10, at 4.
25. See id. at 4, 11. For a copy of this report, see Shih6 Seido Kaikaku Shingikai
[Justice System Reform Council], Shih6 seido kaikaku shingikai ikensho-21 seki no
Nihon o sasaeru shiho seido-[Recommendations of the Justice System Reform
Council-A Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century] (2001), translated in
The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of theJustice System Reform CouncilA Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 119. An electronic copy of the English translation is available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
26. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 842-43. Among other things, Japan instituted
legislation reforming its codes, commercial laws, tort law, administrative procedure,
criminal and civil trial procedure, as well as its legal education system. Id.
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on transparency and ex post review. 27 The current wave of reform
seeks to "reposition the public as actors, not bystanders, in
governance," 28 so that the Japanese public is transformed from
"governed objects" to "governing subjects." 29 Within this context,
citizen participation in criminal trials is geared to incorporate
sound common sense into the deliberative process, increase
public understanding of Japan's judicial system, promote civic
responsibility, and enhance the tools of democracy available to
the citizenry. 30 Reformists also hope citizen participation will
help attain justice in all cases, increase investigative and
prosecutorial accountability, and eliminate wrongful convictions
and other injustices. 31 Kunio Hamada, a former Japanese
Supreme Court Justice, posits that citizen participation will foster
independent thinking and that this "great social experience" will
result in "more Japanese citizens [being] capable of formulating
32
their opinion in international scenes."
Since 2004, Japan has expended immense time, effort, and
financial resources in preparing for the lay judge system. The
government and JFBA spent massive sums promoting the system
to citizens through billboards, print advertisements, television
programs, digital video discs (DVDs),Japanese manga (cartoons),
Japanese anime (animation), a mascot, mock trials, symposiums,
33
advertisement on the website You Tube, and other means. As of
27. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. I, pt. 1, ch. 4, pt. 1.
28. JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10.
29. See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. 1, pt. 1. The JSRC

recommended thatJapan embark on a transformation in which its citizens shed the view
of government as the ruler and take a greater responsibility in governing themselves. Id.
The government needs to respond to the people. Id. In a society facing domestic and
international challenges, theJSRC noted that the citizenry must be creative and develop
their social economic living relationships more autonomously and actively. Id.
30. Id. ch. IV, pt. 1; see Akiko Fujita, Japan Gets Ready for NewJury System, VOICE OF
AMERICA,
July
1,
2009,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-07/
2009-07-01-voa27.cfm.
31. See Fujita, supra note 30; see also JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10;
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. 1, pt. 2 (noting that the judiciary is

expected to serve as the ultimate guardian of the rights and freedoms of the people and
to maintain the legal order with the constitution, but that a substantial number of
evaluations suggest that the judiciary has not necessarily met these expectations
sufficiently).
32. See Fujita, supra note 30 (quoting Kunio Hamada).
33. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Learns Dreaded Task ofJury Duty, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2007, at Al (reporting on widespread efforts to familiarize public with lay judge
system); Saik6 Saibansho [Supreme Court of Japan], Saibanin Seido Heisei 21 nen 5
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the end of 2007, the Supreme Court of Japan had expended
approximately JPY3.6 billion (US$36 million) on advertising the
lay judge system. 34 The Ministry of Justice spent an additional
JPY970 million (US$9.7 million) on advertising activities during
this same period. 35 These governmental organs and theJFBA also
continued to expend significant sums leading up to the official
start date of the lay judge system in May 2009.36
In addition, Japan has spent significant amounts on initial
logistical preparations. 37 For example, courtrooms were
remodeled to create sufficient space for three professional judges
and six citizen judges sitting on the bench. 38 Deliberation rooms
were specially constructed with sensitivity given to the tribunal's
comfort.3 9 As of the end of 2008, facility costs related to the lay
judge system alone totaled approximately JPY23.1 billion
(US$231 million), and additional preparatory expenditures
exceededJPY5.5 billion (US$55 million).40
Expenditures on the lay judge system have reached into the
hundreds of millions of dollars, and will continue to accrue
going forward as Japan operates its new lay judge system. Based
on current estimates, the Supreme Court of Japan estimates
yearly expenditures of JPY2 billion (US$20 million) for lay judge
compensation and JPY1.2 billion (US$12 million) for lay judge
gatsu 21 nichi Sutaato [Lay Judge System Starts on May 21,
2009],
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010); Homusho [Ministry of
Justice of Japan],
Saibanin Seido Koonaa [Lay Judge System Comer],
http://www.moj.go.jp/SAIBANIN/koho/pamph dvd.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
(posting brochures and digital video discs); Japan Federation of Bar Associations,
Saibanin Seido [Lay Judge System], http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/citizen-judge/
(last visitedJan. 24, 2010) (interactive website designed to assist public through lay judge
system); Leussink, supra note 21.
34. See Prime Minister of Japan Taro Aso, Saibanin Seido ni tsuite Kokumin ga
idaiteiru gimon ni taisuru seifu no ninshiki ni kansuru shitsumon shuisho [Opinion
About Questions Concerning the Government's Recognition of Doubts Harbored About
Citizens in the Lay Judge System], Question No. 53 of 2009, available at
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb-shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/b171053.htm.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See generally Saiban-insei Sutaato made Ikagetsu [ One Month to the Start of the Lay
Judge System], YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Japan), Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/
photonews/photo.htm?ge=l&id=12002
(pointing out the various preparations,
including logistical details such as the chair quality and magazine selection in the jury
room, that have been made in sixty trial courts around Japan).
38. Aso, supra note 34.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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travel related expenses. 41 Lay judges and alternate lay judges will
be paidJPY0,000 (US$100) per day for their service during trial,
while citizens participating in the selection process will receive a
maximum of JAPY8,000 (US$80).42 Total expenditures could
increase substantially depending upon the number of serious
criminal cases actually brought to trial. 43 In addition, valuable
resources will be invested in mitigating burdens on the citizenry.
For example, lay judges will have free access to psychological
44
counseling if they are traumatized by the criminal proceedings.
All of these resources have been expended on the
government's presumption that the system must change, and that
citizen understanding and trust in the legal system must be
enhanced. 45 Despite Japan's sizeable investment in the new lay
judge system and its interest in bringing the justice system closer
to the public, opinion polls have consistently shown strong
opposition to participation in the criminal justice process. 46 Even
41. See Kiyotaka Iwata, Saiban-in no NittoulRyohi, Nenkan 32 Okuen Saikosai Yosan
Yokyu e, [Supreme Court Seeks Budget of 3.2 Billion Yen for Lay Judge's Daily Allowance and
Travel Expenses], ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), Aug. 26, 2008, http://www.asahi.com/special/
(foreign exchange calculation was made at
080201/TKY200808250332.html
JPYIOO/US$1). Between 2003 and 2006, Japan saw an average of 3600 cases that would
qualify for lay judge adjudication. Id. The budget contemplates this average. In 2007,
this number dropped to 2643 applicable cases. Id.
42. See Mariko Kato, Those off Lay Judge Hook Feel Relieved: Preparingfor Trial Duty
Exacted Emotional Toll, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at 4, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090804a2.html.
43. Iwata, supranote 41.
44. The Japanese Supreme Court plans to establish a system to provide
psychological counseling to lay judges traumatized after serving in trials involving
serious crimes at no cost. See TraumatizedLay Judges to Get Free Counseling, DAILYYOMIURI
(Japan), June 19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 11660238. The Supreme Court will
establish a free twenty-four hour counseling hotline and pay for a maximum of five
counseling sessions with clinical psychologists. Id.
45. See Aso, supranote 34.
46. See, e.g., Start ofLay Judge System: CandidatesAnxious Over DispensingJustice, DAILY
YOMIURI (Japan), May 21, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 9610521 (citing a
nationwide survey in which "79 percent of respondents said they did not want to be
involved in trials as lay judges, [which is] up from 75 percent in the previous survey in
December 2006."); Leussink, supra note 22 (referencing the Yomiuri survey indicating
seventy-nine percent disapproval rating); Iwata, supra note 41 (disclosing the results of a
poll in which nearly eighty percent of respondents did not want to serve as lay judges);
See Haruka Katakawa, Major Change in Japan's Criminal Trials: Lay Judge System Starts in
May, IIST WORLD FORUM, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.iist.or.jp/wf/magazine/0674/
0674_E.html (citing a poll conducted by the Supreme Court of Japan in April 2008
which showed that nearly forty percent of the 10,500 respondents were unwilling to
participate even if participation was mandatory and forty-five percent were reluctant to
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some attorneys are unconvinced of the merit of changing the
system. 47 The top-down approach in adopting and implementing
the lay judge system was largely instituted without any substantive
public input. Citizens do not feel qualified to judge suspects,
dread the time commitment required by service, fear retaliation
by dangerous defendants, and generally do not want to be
involved in the criminal justice process. 48 Some citizens even
argue that compulsory service violates the constitutionally
guaranteed right of freedom of thought and conscience because
they would be required to pass judgment. 49 Although Japan has
attempted to convince the public about the value of participation
through advertising and other means, winning them over may be
50
a difficult task.
Some skeptics of the new lay judge system also see this as an
expensive experiment in futility. 51 Japan does not have a tradition
of public participation in the criminal justice system. 52 Many
believe that citizen judges will refrain from expressing their
participate, but would do so if participation was mandatory). But see Over 70% Willing to
Take Part in Lay Judge Trials, KYODO NEWS (Japan), July 25, 2009, available at 7/25/09
JWIRE 08:07:22 (Westlaw) (reporting the results of a survey conducted after the
initiation of the new system in which over 70 percent of respondents declared they are
ready to take serve lay judges because it is their civic obligation but nearly 25 percent of
respondents indicated a desire to refuse participation even if legally obligated to do so).
Kunio Hamada, former Supreme Court Justice, says that it is not surprising that public
opinion polls show a negative opinion of the new layjudge trial because Japanese society
does not promote independence. Fujita, supra note 30. In his view, the Japanese
traditionally do not like to separate from the pack. Id.
47. There are lawyers that fundamentally oppose the system on a variety of
grounds. For example, several local bar associations believed that the citizen judge
system should not be introduced, or at least delayed, due to potential concerns about a
rush to judgment or tougher penalties. Lay Judge Plan Fraughtwith Guilty Verdict Dangers,
Bar Groups Say, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nn20081104a2.html.
48. See lwata, supra note 41.
49. See 1st Lay Judge Trial Starts in Tokyo, Reluctance to ParticipateHigh, KYODO NEWS
(Japan), Aug. 3, 2009, available at 8/3/09 JWIRE 11:58:30 (Westiaw) (noting that three
hundred demonstrators picketed outside the trial expressing their objections on these
constitutional grounds).
50. In one display of opposition, many Japanese picketed outside of the first lay
judge proceeding held in August 2009. See Lewis, supra note 1. In another, a woman
screamed out "[p]lease refuse to become lay judges" after a hearing on the first day of
Fujii's trial. 1st Lay Judge Trial Starts in Tokyo, supranote 49.
51. See, e.g.,
Anna Dobrovolskaia, An All-American Jury System Instead of the Lay
Assessor (Saiban-in) System for Japan?Anglo-American Style Jury Trials in Okinawa Under the
U.S. Occupation,24J.JAPANESE L. 57, 60-65 (2007).
52. See Reynolds, supra note 1.
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opinions or interjecting their insights into the process due to the
cultural tradition of harmony in Japan.5 3 There is also doubt that
lay judges can overcome the tradition of leaving criminal matters
to the professionals, 54 or that they will rise above cultural
inclinations against making an independent decision in the face
of trained professionals. 55 As such, many have argued that Japan
will need to adopt an all-citizen jury for the system to succeed
56
and function as intended.
Initially, the Supreme Court vehemently opposed the
concept of a jury system. 57 In striving to protect society and
administer justice, the court did not see any reason to include
amateurs in the process. 58 The court relented on the general
premise that professional judges would maintain their role, and
59
that any changes primarily function to educate the citizenry.
According to the judiciary, the system was not revised because it
was ailing or broken. 60 As such, still other skeptics believe that
professional judges will never allow a verdict if they disagree with
the outcome. They contend that the new system is merely a
faade, and that the mixed professional-citizen judge
composition, combined with structural impediments in the
system, will result in little, if any, substantive change in conviction
rates. 61 Consequently, citizen participation will actually legitimize

53. See Onishi, supra note 33; Hanging in the Balance, supra note 1; Richard Lloyd
Parry, Trial by Jury Returns to Japan and the Lawyers Aren't Happy, TIMES (London), Feb.
28,
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5818123.ece
(asserting that the conformist nature of Japanese citizens and the tendency to follow
authority may make citizens unsuitable to sit on juries).
54. See Reynolds, supra note 1.
55. See Dobrovolskaia, supra note 51, at 64-65.
56. See generally id. (noting calls for the implementation of all-lay person juries
consistent with the Anglo-American style jury systems).
57. See Weber, supra note 12, at 133-34 (observing that the Supreme Court of
Japan resisted almost every argument in favor of jury participation presented by the
reformists). Not only did the court raise fierce opposition to jury trial proposals in any
form, but it also proactively lobbied to ensure that the Diet did not adopt legislation
implementing a pure citizen jury. See TAKASHI MARUTA, SAIBAN'IN SEIDO [THE LAY
JUDGE SYSTEM] 84 (2004), reviewed in Colin P.A. Jones, Prospectsfor Citizen Participationin
Criminal Trials in Japan,15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 363, 367 (2006) (book review).
58. SeeWilson, supra note 10, at 847-48 (describing howJapan's high court balked
at the ability of ordinary citizens to arrive at verdicts more just or consistently than
professional judges).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Leussink, supra note 22.
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the judiciary's current imperfections, instead of improving the
62
delivery ofjustice.
Proponents of the lay judge system are correct in their
assessment that the system has vast potential to change the
criminal justice system and increase the public's awareness of
important social issues. As Japanese society changes and the need
for individual participation in government increases, the
citizenry needs to be more informed and better educated about
the judicial system and criminal process. By promoting citizen
participation in government, the lay judge system stands as a
powerful vehicle for potentially achieving the stated goals and
solidifying the democratic processes promoted by citizen
participation in government.63 It can also be used to instill
greater trust in the truth-finding process, preserve the rights of
the accused, and help ensure the due process of law. 64 Public
participation is vital to overseeing the criminal justice system and
attaining true justice against criminals.
Critics correctly assert that the new lay judge system, at least
in its current form, may fall short of its goals. 65 The system has
many imperfections and faces various obstacles. To overcome
these challenges, the lay judge system and several laws affecting
the system need to be revised. Japan has the opportunity to make
legislative revisions and adjustments to the lay judge system. The
Lay Judge Act was amended to contain an express provision
enabling the government to review the effectiveness of the lay
judge system in 2012, if necessary, and permitting corrective
measures. 66 As such, Japan should utilize this opportunity to lift
the overly strict duty of lifetime secrecy imposed upon citizen

62. Id.
63. See Levin, supra note 19, at 201-02. Criminal defendants are not entitled to a
trial by jury under the Japanese Constitution. See generally KENPO [Constitution]. Citizen
participation in the judicial process as a lay judge is a legislative creation. See Lay Judge
Act, supra note 7, art. 2. As such, the LayJudge Act could be easily repealed by the Diet.
64. See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. I, pt. 3(2); see also
KENPO [Constitution], art. 31.
65. See Joseph J. Kodner, Re-introducing Lay Participationto Japanese Criminal Cases:
An Awkward Yet Necessary Step, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 231, 245 (2003).
66. See Lay Judge Act, supra note 7, supp. art. 8; see also Press Release, Japan Fed'n
of Bar Ass'ns, Bill on Lay Judge System and Criminal Procedure Reform Clears Lower
House (Apr. 23, 2004), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/
meetings/20040423.html (reporting on the transition of a bill amending the Lay Judge
Act to be reviewed three years after its entry into force through the Diet).
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judges, open the doors to the interrogative process, and limit
victim participation to proceedings following the verdict.
II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM INJAPAN
67
At the age of forty-five, Toshikazu Sugaya lost his freedom.
On the frosty morning of December 1, 1991, the Tochigi
prefectural police force barged into the kindergarten bus driver's
home and accused him of kidnapping and murdering Mami
Matsuda, a local four-year-old child. 68 Showing him the girl's
photograph, the police demanded an apology from Sugaya for
Mami's murder and quickly escorted him to the detention
center. 69 In detention, Sugaya was incessantly accused,
interrogated, and shown test results allegedly matching his DNA
with bodily fluid found on Matsuda's clothing. 70 He was denied
food, water, and a lawyer during thirteen hours of intense
interrogation. 71 Investigators allegedly kicked him, pulled his
hair, and shouted in his face. 72 Sugaya was exasperated by the
investigators' unwillingness to listen and their persistent belief
that he committed the crime. 73 Feeling "desolate" from the abuse
and verbal sparring, Sugaya resigned himself to the conclusion
that if he did not confess then he would not be able to go
home. 74 Sugaya broke down in tears of desperation, 75 and
proceeded to fabricate a confession based on media reports that
he had heard. 76 Sugaya never revealed any details of the crime
that only a perpetrator could know, nor could a single witness
corroborate his claim that he took the victim to the crime scene
77
by bicycle.

67. See Setsuko Kamiya, High Court OKs Sugaya Retrial: Challenge to Wrongful
Conviction Not Allowed, JAPAN TIMES, June 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12058384.
68. See id.; Sugaya: 'I Confessed out of Despair, DAILYYOMIURI (Japan), June 9, 2009,
availableat 2009 WLNR 10964663.
69. See Sugaya: 'I Confessed out of Despair',supra note 68.
70. Id.
71. See Miscarriage of Justice Could Be Turning Point for Japan'sJustice System, IRISH
TIMES,July 28, 2009, at 11.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Sugaya: 'I Confessed out of Despair, supra note 68.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Editorial, Sugaya's Retrial Ordered, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), June 25, 2009,
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200906250061 .html.
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After gaining access to legal counsel, Sugaya recanted his
confession claiming that it was made under duress. 78 He also
challenged the reliability of unproven DNA testing methods and
tainted evidence. 79 Notwithstanding, Sugaya was sentenced to life
in prison based on his confession and DNA evidence. 80
Subsequent appeals and petitions for retrials were rejected.8 '
On June 4, 2009, Sugaya was freed from prison more than
seventeen years after his arrest. 82 Improved DNA testing
confirmed that Sugaya had not committed the crime. 83 In an
extremely rare move, the Japanese police apologized to Sugaya
for his wrongful conviction and unjust imprisonment. 84
Expressing deep regret and remorse, the Tochigi police chief
offered "sincere apologies for having subject[ed] [Sugaya] to a
long and distressing ordeal." 85 Having lost nearly two decades of
his life, however, the apology rang hollow for Sugaya. He insists
on an investigation into his wrongful conviction and apologies

78. See Tokyo High Court OrdersRetrialfor Sugaya, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), June 23,
2009, http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200906230292.html.
79. Id.
80. See Police Chief Sory for Sugaya's Pain, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), June 18, 2009,
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TK200906180101.html;
Ashikaga Jiken,
Saishin Kaishi o Kettei Tokyo Kosai [Ashikaga Incident, Start of Retrial Decided, Tokyo High
Court], ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 23, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0623/
TKY200906230044.html.
81. See Tokyo High Court Orders Retrialfor Sugaya, supra note 78. Sugaya's appeal to
the Tokyo High Court was dismissed in 1996. Id. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Japan
confirmed that the original DNA test could be used as evidence, but also noted that
technological advances in DNA testing should be taken into consideration and carefully
weighed. Id. Sugaya filed for a retrial with the Utsunomiya District Court in 2002, but
this request was rejected six years later in 2008. Id.
82. Id. Although Sugaya can claim up to JPY12,500 (about US$125) for every day
spent in confinement from the Japanese government pursuant to the Criminal
Compensation Law, money cannot adequately compensate the time lost in spending
over seventeen years in jail. See Yuichiro Nakamura et al., Confession, 1st DNA Test Likely
Focus of Probe, DAILYYOMIURI (Japan),June 25, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 12067118.
83. See Tokyo High Court OrdersRetrialfor Sugaya, supra note 78.
84. See Tochigi Police Chief Apologizes to Sugaya, DAILY YOMIURI (japan), June 18,
2009, available at 2009 WLNR 11588689 (describing the official apology issued to Mr.
Sugaya in person by Chief Shoichiro Ishikawa on behalf of the Tochigi Prefecture
Police). This was the first time that Mr. Sugaya received a direct apology from any
investigative organization. Id. In the Sugaya case, the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office
concluded that the prosecutors relied on the authenticity of the confession too much,
and that the investigators should have examined the confession and evidence more
closely. Nakamura et al., supra note 82.
85. See Tochigi Police ChiefApologizes to Sugaya, supra note 84.
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from the investigators, scientists who conducted the DNA tests,
86
and judges who contributed to wrongly convicting him.
Sugaya is not alone in falling victim to the overly-aggressive
criminal investigation system of Japan. For example, there was
considerable public outcry when police detained twelve suspects
in 2007 in connection with an alleged vote-buying scheme in the
small town of Shibushi, Japan. 87 After intense questioning and
coercive tactics, six of the suspects admitted to buying votes in a
local election using liquor, cash, and catered parties.88 Not only
were all defendants acquitted, but the district court found that
the confessions were made "in despair" due to "marathon
questioning."89 Other widely publicized recent cases involved the
involuntary confession of a man who confessed to killing three
women after 170 hours of interrogation over the course of
seventeen days; 90 a taxi driver in Toyoma Prefecture who served a
three year prison term for a rape that he did not commit based
upon an involuntary confession obtained when he was
"browbeaten" into ratifying a written confession drafted by the
police;9' and the wrongful conviction of a Russian citizen accused
of robbery who was pressured to confess. 92 The case of Iwao
86. See id.
87. See JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, REPORT OF THE JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR

ASSOCIATIONS IN RESPONSE TO COMMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN CONCERNING
THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITrEE AGAINST TORTURE 10

(2008), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/ja/kokusai/humanrights-library/
treaty/data/AltRepCATCJP COlIen.pdf; see also Norimitsu Onishi, Pressed by Police,
Even Innocent Confess in Japan,N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at Al.
88. See Onishi, supra note 87. One suspect, Sachio Kawabata, was forced to stomp
on the names of his loved ones. Id. This practice is similar to the fumi-e tactic used by the
Tokugawa shoguns in which Japanese leaders forced suspected Christians to step on a
sacred image ofJesus Christ. See STEPHEN R. TURNBULL, THE SAMURAI AND THE SACRED
120 (2006). Citizens refusing to step on the image and denounce their faith were
subsequently killed. Id. Other tactics included threatening suspects' children. See Onishi,
supra note 87. Kawabata subsequently prevailed in a civil lawsuit against the government
for mental anguish resulting from improper interrogation tactics. Id. One suspect was
under so much duress that he attempted to commit suicide during the ordeal. Id.
89. See Onishi, supra note 87.
90. Id. No evidence other than the confession existed against the defendant in this
Saga Prefecture case. Id. In March 2007, the high court upheld the acquittal of this man
and prosecutors appealed. Id.
91. Id.; accordKamiya, supra note 358; Sugaya: 'I Confessed out of Despair', supra note
68. The taxi driver was exonerated only after the actual culprit was caught by the police
three years into the taxi driver's sentence. Onishi, supra note 87.
92. Vladimir Shilov was cleared of a robbery conviction after finding that his
confession to robbery charges was coerced. See Cop Who Forced 'Fumiji' Confession Avoids
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Hakamada is yet another example. Despite the fact that the
clothing that prosecutors claimed that Hakamada wore on the
night of the quadruple murder did not fit him and the alleged
murder weapon was too small to make the wounds, the
prosecutors obtained a confession based on twenty-two days of
extended interrogations in a small police detention cell. 93 This
confession led to a conviction even though Hakamada almost
immediately retracted his confession and testified that he had
been threatened and beaten during interrogations. 94 In 2007,
Norimichi Kumamoto, one of the three judges who tried
Hakamada, went public with his belief that Hakamada's
95
confession was coerced and that the judgment was erroneous.
In 2006, the problems were further highlighted when a
computer file entitled "Guidelines for the Interrogation of
Suspects" was leaked from a police computer. 96 The guidelines
encouraged weakening suspects through long interrogations and
maximal use of the twenty-four-hour period of control over a
97
suspect.
A.

General Characteristicsof the System

When a crime occurs in Japan, the police typically
investigate the crime, arrest the alleged perpetrator, and then
promptly refer the accused to the Public Prosecutors Office. 98
The Public Prosecutors Office takes statements from the victim
and witnesses, interrogates the suspect, and decides whether to
prosecute. 99 Japanese prosecutors have extensive powers. A
"suspect" may be detained for up to twenty-three days before an

Prison, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nn20080319a2.html.
93. See Fukuoka Woman Cleared in '04 Slaying of Brother,JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080201f2.html.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASs'NS, supra note 22, at 5.
97. Id. at 2.
98. See PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE, FOR THE VICTIMS OF CRIME: ABOUT THE
PROTECTION
AND
SUPPORT
SYSTEM
FOR VICTIMS
3
(2007),
available at

http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/CRAB/crab-02.pdf.
99. See id.; see also DAVID T. JOHNSON, THEJAPANESE WAY OFJUSTICE: PROSECUTING
CRIME INJAPAN 13-14 (2002).
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indictment is required. 100 During this time, prosecutors have
substantial latitude in their investigative techniques, particularly
with respect to "suspects" who do not have the same rights as
charged "defendants." 101 This includes the right to counsel
during interrogations.1 0 2 In the past, numerous suspects have
claimed that they were abused, tortured, and forced to confess
10 3
during the extended twenty-three-day detention period.
1.

Crime Investigation and the Role of Confessions in Japanese
Criminal Jurisprudence and Practice

The investigation of criminal behavior stands as the first
important process within a criminal justice system, and the
interrogation of suspects plays an integral role in the investigative
process. 104 In Japan, the interrogation process is vital to
ascertaining the truth. 10 5 Interrogations are intended to obtain
"relevant evidence that may be admissible in court proceedings
for the prosecution of an alleged offender."10 6Evidence extracted
from an interrogation can include a confession or an admission
107
against interest.
The evidence obtained through interrogation is subject to
several very important limitations however. The Japanese
Constitution and public international law entitle a suspect to the
presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and the right to
legal advice. 108 In addition, all confessions proffered into
100. SeeJOHNSON, supra note. 99, at 13-14; see also infra notes 113-17 (outlining
legal framework for holding a suspect in custody).
101. See Fujita, supra note 30; see also David A. Suess, Paternalism Versus Pugnacity:
The Right to Counsel in Japanand the United States, 72 IND. L.J. 291, 300-06 (1996) (stating
that several factors practically limit defendants' right to counsel, despite the language of
the constitution).
102. See Suess, supra note 101, at 303.
103. See Jeff Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human
Rights Abuses in theJapanesePenal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329, 360-63 (2003).
104. See Int'l Bar Ass'n, Interrogationof Criminal Suspects inJapan-TheIntroduction of
Electronic Recording 5 (2003),
available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=340486E4-A77A-4205-A73C-F422C3714CBB.
105. See Comm. Against Torture, Comments from the Government of Japan to the
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/
C/JPN/CO/1 (Nov. 5, 2008).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Kenp6 [Constitution], arts. 31-38; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Int'l Bar Ass'n, supra
note 104.
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evidence must be voluntary, reliable, and consistent with
constitutional guarantees. Article 38 of the constitution of Japan
governs interrogations and the use of confessions at trial. This
article stipulates that "[n]o person shall be compelled to testify
against himself..." and that any confessions made under
compulsion, torture, threat, or prolonged detention "shall not be
admitted in evidence." 109 Moreover, no person "shall be
convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him
is his own confession."110
Under the current system, Japanese
police and
prosecutors"' have a considerable amount of time to hold,
112
question, and obtain a confession from a suspect in detention.
When the police make an arrest, they will first interrogate the
suspect. Within forty-eight hours, they will then hand the suspect
over to prosecutors.1 13 Prosecutors then have twenty-four hours to
114
obtain permission to continue holding the suspect in custody.
With court approval, prosecutors can hold and question a suspect
in captivity for two additional consecutive ten-day periods before
formal charges must be filed. 115 When a suspect does not
immediately confess, a prosecutor almost always seeks approval to
continue detaining a suspect for the additional twenty-day
117
period.11 6 Such requests are approved over 99.8% of the time.
During this twenty-three day initial detention period, Japanese
investigators exert considerable effort towards obtaining a
109. Kenp6 [Constitution], art. 38, translated in 1 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 1000
(1947).
110. Id.
111. As of March 2008, Japan had 1680 public prosecutors and 900 assistant
prosecutors. See Kamiya, supra note 149.
112. See supra note 100. The system of holding suspects in police custody is known
in Japanese as daiyo kangoku (substitute prison). Id.; see also Vize, supra note 103, at 33234.
113. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 203; see also Supreme Court of
Japan, Outline of Criminal Justice in Japan, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
proceedings/criminal-justice.htmIl (last visitedJan. 24, 2010).
114. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 205.
115. Id. art. 208.
116. See Daijiro Yasuda, Speech at the University of Melbourne Law School: One
Aspect of Criminal Justice
in Japan:
Confessions
(2005),
available at
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/documents/23Feb2005Conf/Yasuda2005OneAspectOfCriminalJusticelnJapan.pdf. It should be noted that the twenty-three day
period can be extended if a suspect is being investigated for multiple crimes. Vize, supra
note 103, at 333.
117. See Vize, supra note 103, at 333; Yasuda, supranote 117.
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confession. Often the quest to obtain a confession takes priority
18
over serious factual and forensic investigation."
Investigators utilize this initial detention period to
interrogate and focus on securing a confession. 119 There is no
express legal limitation regarding the amount of time that can be
spent on interrogations. During detention, a detainee's life
revolves around lengthy interrogation sessions that exceed ten
hours per day, constant surveillance, and strict rules of
conduct. 120 Interrogators take full advantage of the lack of
restrictions. 121 In Japan, interrogation records handwritten by
22
investigators have been the status quo for decades.
Additionally, confessions are easier to obtain during
preliminary detention given that "suspects" have fewer rights
than "defendants" during the twenty-three day period. Although
a suspect may immediately hire legal counsel upon detention,
there are limitations to the role of counsel. For indigent suspects,
state-appointed counsel has traditionally not been available
unless and until prosecutors handed down an indictment. 123 Only
a charged defendant has traditionally possessed the right to state124
appointed counsel.

118. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 184.
119. SeeVize, supra note 103, at 333.
120. Id. at 333-34. See generally Comm. Against Torture, supra note 105
(recommending that Japan take "immediate and effective measures to bring pre-trial
detention into conformity with international minimum standards.").
121. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19,at 184.
122. See YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW:
THE IMPACr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 271 (1998) (stating that only
about twenty percent of suspects actually hire counsel during the detention phase).
123. See generally David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility
of Order, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247 (1998) (describing the typical interrogation
procedures used by prosecutors in Japan).
124. See IWASAWA, supra note 122, at 271 (explaining that although article 34 of the
constitution states that "no person shall be arrested or detained.., without the privilege
of counsel," that this relates to the ability to independently hire counsel and that the
clause in article 37(3) of the constitution noting that at all times a "criminal defendant"
shall have the assistance of counsel at the state's expense if the defendant is unable to
secure the same by his or her own efforts).
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Criminal Trial of the Accused

Before the lay judge system, trial sessions convened at the
average rate of one session per month. 125 Cases were generally
decided by a tribunal, comprised of one or three professional
judges, which relied heavily on written materials including an
investigation dossier compiled by the prosecutor. 126 Professional
judges in Japan served concurrently as the finder of fact and the
arbiter of law.127 Judges also determined the sentences of the
accused. 128 As such, trials were one-phase, intermittent
proceedings in which professional judges simultaneously
considered guilt and sentencing matters. 129 Trial sessions
13
convened at the average rate of one session per month. 0
The prosecution's dossier was particularly well developed
and structured to ensure a conviction. 131 Notwithstanding
objections from defense counsel, judges generally accepted the
prosecutor's file into evidence with little, if any, reservation. 132
Moreover, Japanese prosecutors only needed to disclose to the
defense statements that they intend to introduce into evidence at
trial, so contradictory statements from the same or different
sources never emerged from the prosecutor's office. 133 Within
this environment, Japan's criminal conviction rate was 99.8%.134
In the event of an unlikely setback at trial, prosecutors could find
some solace in the right to appeal. Either side in a criminal

125. See JOHNSON, supra note 99, at 14-15; see also Posting of Isabel Reynolds to
RawJapan, supra note 1.
126. See JOHNSON, supra note 99, at 14; see also Kodner, supra note 65, at 237;
Leussink, supra note 22.
127. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW INJAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 298-

99 (2003).

128. Id.; see also SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW OFJAPAN: THE GENERAL
PART 327 (BJ. George trans., 1997).
129. See generally PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE, supra note 98 (explaining that after
concluding the examination of evidence, the prosecutor recommends an appropriate
punishment after which the court will render a sentence).
130. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 99, at 14-15; see also Reynolds, supra note 1.
131. See Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan:A Story of New
Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORYINT'L L. REV. 127, 207 (1994).
132. See Lateline: Japan's Tough Justice (Australian Broadcasting Company television
broadcast May 31, 2001), transcript at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/stories/
s306103.htm) (interviewing Satoru Shinomiya, law professor and criminal defense
lawyer).
133. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 99, at 40-41.
134. See Onishi, supra note 87; see also Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 184.
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matter can appeal as of right based on matters of fact, matters of
135
law, or issues involving sentencing.
Some theories suggest that Japan's near-absolute conviction
rate results from skillful prosecutors who are "exceptionally
adept at reaching just dispositions." 136 Others explain that
conservative case selection and low prosecutorial budgets mean
that the government does not prosecute absent the prospect of
certain outcomes. 137 Some observers even suggest that the
extreme conviction rate stems from the tendency to avoid
adversarial relations with other system actors, 13 8 defendants'
proclivity not to contest guilt,139 or the significant procedural
advantages available to prosecutors." 40 Nevertheless, it is difficult
to adequately explain a conviction rate that nears perfection in
any criminal system. 141 In fact, it begs the question of whether
such perfection can be justified, or whether due process and
defendants' rights are being sacrificed in the name of perfection.
Observers
note
that Japanese
prosecutors
derive
extraordinary power from their ability to prejudge suspects
within a rigidly bureaucratic and hierarchical structure. 142
Prosecutors operate in an opaque environment of nondisclosure
and largely without the interference of defense counsel. 143 They
can be reluctant to admit mistakes, and subject to demotion or

135. See PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICE, supra note 98.
136. SeeJOHNSON, supranote 99, at 5-6.
137. SeeJ. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why is theJapanese Conviction Rate So
High?, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53-54 (2001).

138. See David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS 140, 156 (Malcolm M. Feeley &

Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 137, at 53-54. Professor Johnson
advocates that the rate is so high based on the concept of consensus and Japanese
defense attorneys' tendency to go along in an effort to get along with the police and
prosecutors, particularly in comparison with defense attorneys in the United States. Id.
139. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES,

AND COMMENTARY 445 (2006); see also Levin, supra note 19, at 227.
140. See Levin, supra note 19, at 227.
141. In contrast, the Japanese rate compares with a ninety percent conviction rate
in U.S. federal courts in 2005. See MARK MOTWANS, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

FEDERAL

JUSTICE

STATISTICS

2005

(2008),

available

at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/s05.pdf.
142. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 99, at 6.
143. See Hiroshi Matsubara, Trial by Prosecutor,LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 11
(contrasting expansive search, seizure, and interrogation powers Japanese prosecutors
have with that of U.S. prosecutors).
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termination for even a single acquittal. 144 Prosecutors also tend to
defer to bureaucratic interests or public pressure.145 As a result,
Japanese courts have been characterized as venues that "confirm
whether someone is guilty" based on the prosecutors' pretrial
investigation, as opposed to U.S. and European criminal courts,
in which trials focus on determining the defendant's innocence
or guilt. 146 A former Japanese high court judge asserts that
prosecutorial dominance is so complete in Japan that "real
criminal trials" are conducted in the prosecutor's office, not in
147
open court.
3. Confessions as the "King of Evidence"
Japan's conviction rate hovers around 99.9%. 148 This nearly
perfect conviction rate has been attributed to high confession
rates, conservative prosecutors who indict suspects only when a
conviction is highly likely, the absence of juries, external and
internal pressures on judges, limited resources for suspects and
defendants, and other structural features of the criminal justice
system that favor prosecutors. 149 In comparing the varying
explanations, it is apparent that the high confession rate plays an
instrumental role in the nearly perfect conviction rate.
Confessions play a vital role in Japanese law enforcement,
crime control, and criminal jurisprudence as well. 150 A confession
is often referred to as the "king of evidence" in Japanese
courtrooms.' 5 ' Despite the constitutionally guaranteed right to
remain silent, 152 prosecutors typically rely upon signed
confessions at trial. 153 In fact, confessions form the foundation of
144. Id.
145. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 66, at 6.
146. Lateline: Japan's Tough Justice, supra note 132 (quoting former Japanese
prosecutor, Takeshi Tsuchimoto).
147. JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 6-7 (quoting Judge Takeo Ishimatsu, who handled
criminal cases for thirty years, and observed that court hearings are empty shells that
validate the egregious trampling of human rights through the prosecutorial process).
148. See supra note 134.
149. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
150. See Saul M. Kassin, InternalizedFalse Confessions, in I HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY 169, 170 (Michael P. Togilia et al. eds., 2006).
151. Onishi, supra note 87 (quoting Kenzo Akiyama, a Japanese attorney who
served as ajudge for nearly twenty-five years).
152. KENPO [Constitution], art. 38.
153. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 184; Yasuda, supra note 117, at 2
(citing article 322(1) of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure which states: "A
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over 90% of all criminal convictions in Japan. 154 Accordingly,
efforts to acquire a confession assume the central role in criminal
prosecutions, and the methods used to question and interrogate
suspects assume a particularly important role in the prosecutorial
process.1 - 5 Due to the heavy reliance placed on confessions,
Japanese police and prosecutors employ a variety of tactics
including extended, daily questioning during the initial twentythree day detention period. 156 In difficult cases in which a suspect
fails to confess, interrogations may include undue pressure,
157
threats, inappropriate actions, and even psychological torture.
Given that a confession serves as a prosecutor's "most potent
weapon," 5 8 other aspects of the trial become superfluous once
the government introduces a confession into evidence. 15 9 As
such, Japanese prosecutors are often guilty of building their cases
on confessions instead of solid evidence. 160 Investigators justify
their reliance on confessions on the lack of prosecutorial powers
routinely available in other countries, such as the authority to
plea bargain, offer testimonial immunity, or conduct undercover
stings.'6 1 Additionally, prosecutors and judges treat confessions as
written declaration made by the accused or the deposition of the accused which is
signed or sealed thereby may be made as evidence.").
154. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 184.
155. See Upper House Passes Bill to Fully Record, Film Interrogations,KYODO NEWS, Apr.
24, 2009, available at 4/24/09JWIRE 09:27:10 (Westlaw).
156. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 87, at 10.
157. See Arne Soldwedel, TestingJapan'sConvictions: The Lay Judge System and Rights
of CriminalDefendants, 41 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1417, 1433 (2008) (reporting methods
used to extract confessions include slapping, punching, kicking, sleep deprivation,
promises of timely release, threatening more stringent punishments, isolation, lack of
privacy, nonstop questioning, binding fingers, standing for long periods, shouting, and
offers of freedom in return for a confession); see also Onishi, supra note 87 (quoting
Kenzo Akiyama as stating that authorities use "psychological torture"); Vize, supra note
103, at 334 (noting aJFBA survey of former detainees that revealed interrogation tactics
such as threatening to ruin the suspect's or a family member's reputation, beating or
assaulting, binding fingers, forced standing in a fixed position for prolonged periods,
making promises in exchange for a confession, and waking the suspect up in the middle
of the night for questioning).
158. CHRISTINE BOYLE ET AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE-FACT FINDING, FAIRNESS,
AND ADVOCACY 781 (Edmond Montgomery Publications Ltd. 1999) (1949).
159. See Kassin, supra note 150, at 170-80 (citing supportive works from Kassin &
Kiechel, Horselenberg et al., as well as Redlich and Goodman).
160. See Onishi, supra note 87.
161. See DANIEL H. FOOTE, LAW IN JAPAN: TURNING POINT 349 (2008). However,
observers have analogized that confessions play the functional equivalent of a plea
bargain, in that the accused confesses in exchange for the government's implicit
agreement to seek a lighter sentence. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 137, at 57.
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the first important step on the road to rehabilitation. 162
Offenders who readily confess and exhibit remorse will enhance
their position before the court, and likely receive a lighter
sentence. 163 External observers, however, explain that other
factors fuel the incessant prosecutorial quest for a confession
including, among others, the need to prevail, 164 fear of
professional demotion or career failure, 165 media pressure, 166 and
167
the public's desire to quickly solves crimes.
B.

Removing the Doors: Increasingthe Visibility to Justice
1. Justice System Reform Council

In 1999, Japan formed the Justice System Reform Council to
consider legal reforms that would help revive its stumbling
economy and lead it into the twenty-first century. 168 After two
years of deliberation and debate, the JSRC submitted its
recommendations to the Japanese Cabinet. 169 The JSRC
advanced three pillars of fundamental reform: (1) a justice
system that "shall be made easier to use, easier to understand,
and more reliable;" (2) a legal profession "rich both in quality

162. SeeJUSTICE SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 27, ch. II, pts. 2, 4(2)b; see also
Onishi, supra note 87; Yasuda, supra note 117, at 2.
163. SeeYasuda, supra note 117, at 2.
164. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 137, at 61 (quoting one Tokyo
prosecutor who stated that prosecutors regard acquittal as a very serious problem and
that if there is any doubt about the strength of a case, then he will not indict).
165. See id.
166. See Yasuda, supra note 117, at 1. But seeJOHNSON, supra note 99, at 30-31
(pointing out that Japanese prosecutors are not subject to election, and therefore,
isolated from the public fury and scrutiny faced in other systems such as the United
States).
167. See id.
168. The Diet enacted the Act for Establishment of the Justice System Reform
Council, and formed the Justice System Reform Council pursuant to this Act in July
1999. See Shih6 seido kaikaku shingikai secchiho [Justice System Reform Council
Establishment Act], Law No. 68 of 1999, art. 2; Ministry of Justice, Ensuring that the
Results of the Justice System Reform Take Root, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/
issues/issues01.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010) (outlining history of reform legislation);
see alsoJustice Sys. Reform Council, The Points at Issue in the Justice Reform (Dec. 21,
1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/991221-e.html (noting
thatJapan entered a new century with enormous financial deficits, economic difficulties,
and various social issues).
169. See Justice Sys. Reform Council, supra note 168. For a copy of the report, see
JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25.
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and quantity;" and (3) a "popular base" in which citizens' trust in
the legal system is enhanced through their participation in legal
proceedings.17 0 As an integral part of these reforms, the JSRC
envisioned that the judicial system would assume an enhanced
role in society as Japan shifts away from centralized control and
heavy regulation. 171 The JSRC also envisioned a trustworthy
criminal justice system capable of discovering the truth
172
consistently with the due process of law.
As a result of the JSRC Recommendations, the Diet passed
173
the Act on the Promotion of the Judiciary Reform System.
Pursuant to this Act, the Office for Promotion of Justice System
174
Reform ("OPJSR") was established within the Japanese cabinet
in December 2001 to facilitate justice system reform and take the
lead in drafting related legislation. 175 In its first three years of its
existence, the OPJSR was involved in the promulgation and
passage of twenty-four major legal reforms. 176 These reforms
included, among others, various civil litigation reforms in 2003
designed to accelerate the adjudication of civil cases, 177 expand
the subject matter jurisdiction of summary courts, 78 improve the
Code of Civil Procedure, 79 and update the Arbitration Act.18 0 In
170. SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supranote 25, ch. I pt. 3(1).
171. SeeJustice Sys. Reform Council, supra note 168; see also Weber, supra note 12,
at 150-51.
172. SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supranote 25.
173. See Shiho seido kaikaku suishin ho [Justice System Reform Promotion Act],
Law No. 119 of 2001; see alsoJustice Sys. Reform Council, supra note 168.
174. The cabinet is the executive branch of government in Japan. It consists of the
Prime Minister and ministers of state. See generally The Prime Minister of Japan and his
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/meibo/
The
Cabinet,
Cabinet,
index.e.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The Cabinet Office was established in 2001 to
strengthen the functions of the cabinet, enable the Prime Minister to better assert
leadership over nationally important issues, and cope effectively with Japan's rapidly
changing economy and society. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Naikakufu no
Panfuretto [Cabinet Office Government of Japan Pamphlet], http://www.cao.go.jp/about/
pmf2009/hyo2_pl.pdf (last visitedJan. 24, 2010).
175. Justice Sys. Reform Council, supra note 168. The Office for Promotion of
Justice System Reform consisted of the Prime Minister and other cabinet leaders. Id.
176. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR AsS'NS, supra note 10.
177. See Saiban nojinsokuka ni kansuru h6ritsu [Act on the Expediting of Trials],
Law No. 107 of 2003, translatedat http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/
?id=133&vm=02&re=02.
178. See Shih6 seido kaikaku no tame no saibansho-h6 nado no ichibu o kaisei suru
h6ritsu [Act for Partial Amendment to the Court], Law No. 128 of 2003.
179. See Minji sosh6h6 to no ichibu o kaisei suru h6ritsu [Act for Partial Revision of
to the Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 108 of 2003.
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2004, the Diet adopted various criminal justice reforms,
including the lay judge system;18 a new pretrial arrangement
proceeding system designed to improve, accelerate, and
streamline criminal trials;182 and a court-appointed defense
counsel system for suspects and criminal defendants.18 3 Japan
also made significant reforms to the dispute resolution system in
2004, including the establishment of the Intellectual Property
High Court, 184 implementation of an amended labor dispute
1 85
system in which labor affairs specialists handle adjudication,
amendments to the administrative litigation system, 186 and
18 7
addition of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
To realize the full potential of this revolutionary wave of
reform, Japan implemented legislation in 2002 to establish U.S.style professional law schools with an eye to increase the number
and quality of legal professionals. 188 Previously, Japan relied upon

180. See Chusaih6 [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003. An English translation
of this law is electronically available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/
arbitrationlaw.pdf.
181. See supra note 7.
182. See Keiji soshoh6 t6 no ichibu o kaisei sur horitsu [Act for Partial Revision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004.
183. S6g6 horitsu shien ho [Comprehensive Legal Support Law], Law No. 74 of
2004, translated at http://eiyaku.hounavi.jp/eigo/h16aa000740201.php (establishing a
nationwide legal support center to provide information and services that facilitate the
settlement of legal disputes); see alsoJustice Sys. Reform Council, supra note 168. The
system of assigning court-appointed defense lawyers prior to indictments at national
expense began in October 2006. The appointment system initially only covered the most
serious crimes. Id.; see also Home Issues Top Lay Judge Trials, supra note 1. On May 21,
2009, however, the system was expanded to cover crimes that carry prison terms that can
exceed three years with or without forced labor. Justice Sys. Reform Council, supra note
168.
184. See Chiteki zaisan koto saibansho sechih6 [Act for Establishment of the
Intellectual Property High Court], Law No. 119 of 2004. An English translation of this
law is electronically available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/
IPHC.pdf.
185. See Rod6 shinpanho [Labor Tribunal Act], Law No. 45 of 2004.
186. See Gyosei jiken soshoh6 no ichibu o kaisei suru horitsu [Act for Partial
Revision of the Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 84 of 2004.
187. See Saibaingai funso kaiketsu tetsuzuki no riy6 ni sokushin ni kansuru horitsu
[Act on Promotion of Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution], Law No. 151 of 2004; see
also S6go h6ritsu shienho [Comprehensive Legal Support Act], Law No. 74 of 2004. An
English translation of the alternative dispute resolustion law is electronically available at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/AOP.pdf.
188. See Monbu-kagakush6 [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and
Technology], Senmonshoku Daigakuin (Hokadaigakuin/Kyoushoku Daigakuin)
[Professional
Graduate Schools
(Law and Teaching Graduate
Schools)],
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undergraduate law faculties and a specialized legal and training
institute to provide legal education. 189 With a goal to increase the
number of attorneys, Japan established seventy-four new
professional law schools and raised its annual bar pass rate from
three percent to over forty percent. 190 Essentially, Japan plans on
increasing the number of new attorneys from 1200 to 3000 per
year by early next decade, however the bar exam passage rate
over the past three years has been much lower than the planned
target. 191 In 2006, Japan had approximately 27,000 legal
professionals. 192 With the planned increases, this number is
expected to rise to 50,000 by 2018.193
2. LayJudge System
The lay judge system is the product of considerable
preparation. 194 Typical of other aspects of Japanese law, the lay
judge system borrows and mixes concepts from various countries.
The system resembles typical common law jury systems in that lay
judges are randomly selected from voter lists and participation is

http://www.mext.go.jp/a menu/koutou/houka/houka.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter ProfessionalLaw Schools]; see also Ministry ofJustice, supra note 168.
189. See Waseda University Law School, Transformation of Japan's System ofJustice,
http://www.waseda.jp/law-school/eng/system.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). The
previous system was hampered not only by the 1200 person cap on the number of
lawyers licensed each year, but also because many lawyers were ill equipped to deal with
diverse and sophisticated legal issues that require broader intellectual backgrounds in
fields such as science and economics because they did not have academic background in
subjects other than law. Id.
190. See Colin P.A. Jones, Japan's Push to Add Lawyers Fraught with Troubles, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 8, 2008, at 83; 10 Law Schools Mulling Cutting Student Quotas, DAILY YOMIURI
(Japan), May 22, 2008, at 2, available at 2008 WLNR 9593249 (citing problems with law
schools filling their target enrollment numbers); Dai Adachi, Legal Sector Split on Raising
Lawyer Numbers, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Feb. 6, 2008, at 3, available at 2008 WLNR
2173326.
191. See Success Rate at Bar Exam Lowest at 27%, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), Sept. 1213, 2009, at 1 (citing a bar passage rate of only 27.6% and the number of successful
examinees as 2043, well short of the target mark of 2500 to 2900 successful test takers.);
see also Adachi, supra note 190. As of June 23, 2009, the number of cases in which
Japanese courts appointed lawyers to suspects increased tenfold over the same time
during the previous year. Home Issues Top Lay Judge Trials, supra note 1. In the one
month following the implementation of the lay judge system, Japanese courts appointed
defenses attorneys in 6730 cases. Id.
192. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR AW'NS, supra note 10.
193. See id.
194. See Kamiya, supra note 3.
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limited to a single case. 195 Unless excused by the court or
excluded
by
peremptory
challenge,
participation
is
196
compulsory. At the same time, the system also mirrors civil law
systems, such as the sch6ffe lay judge system in Germany1 97 or the
echevin system in France,1 98 in which citizens participate in trials
as "lay judges" alongside professional judges. This contrasts with
the all-citizen petit jury found in the United States and other.
common law countries. 199 Under the new Japanese system,
tribunals will consist of six lay judges selected to serve alongside
2 00
three professional judges in contested serious criminal cases.
At trial, the lay judges will determine facts, reach verdicts, and
decide sentences with authority theoretically equivalent to that of
the professional judges. 20 1 In uncontested serious criminal cases,
four lay judges and one professional judge will handle the
202
sentencing.
Pursuant to the LayJudge Act, the Japanese public will serve
as lay judges in criminal trials involving serious crimes, such as
homicide, robbery resulting in bodily injury or death, bodily
injury resulting in death, unsafe driving resulting in death, arson
of an inhabited building, kidnapping for ransom, abandonment
of parental responsibilities resulting in the death of a child, as
well as certain rape, drug, and counterfeiting offenses.20 3 One
might reasonably question why public participation has been
directed to criminal trials involving serious crimes. In fact, the
public might be more comfortable deciding civil matters in
which they would not be subject to gruesome images, pressures
associated with sentencing (including the death penalty), and
20 4
fear stemming from trying organized mafia or yakuza members.
195. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10.
196. See LayJudge Act, supra note 7, arts. 13-18.
197. See generally JOHN PHILIP DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 94-115 (1999)
(outlining history of sch6ffen in the German judicial system).
198. See generally id, at 39-83 (1999) (outlining history of the 9chevin system in
France).
199. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 847-48.
200. See LayJudge Act, supra note 7, art. 2(2).
201. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10.
202. See LayJudge Act, supra note 7, art. 2(3).
203. Id.; see SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN ET AL., START OF THE SAIBAN-IN SYSTEM 4

(2005),
available
at
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/rel info/
download?re=02&info id=28.
204. For example, even prosecutors recognize the potential fear and harm
associated with such cases as they debated whether to ask the Saitama District Court for
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In response, the Ministry of Justice has maintained that citizen
involvement with violent crimes is vital because "the more
heinous the crime, the more meaning there is in the restoration
of social justice by citizens, in whom sovereignty rests." 20 5 The
government further believes
that criminal
cases are
straightforward and easier to understand than civil matters, so
evidentiary disputes can be narrowed down before trial and in20 6
court examinations will be comparatively shorter.
a. Procedural Differences
The procedural aspects of the new lay judge system will
differ substantially from past practice. Trials will be held on
consecutive days, as opposed to the system of the past that held
criminal proceedings sporadically over the course of months, if
not years. 20 7 The first trial handled by lay judges was historic in
that it was held over the course of four consecutive days. 20 8 This
systemic change will substantially enhance speed and efficiency
within the criminal justice system. It will also deliver on the
209
constitutional promise of the right to a speedy trial.
Contrary to past practice, the new system will also reduce the
focus on written dossiers and place more value on trial advocacy,
in-court questioning of witnesses, and the use of simple-tounderstand terminology. 210 Live questioning of witnesses has
been a historic rarity. 211 With the adoption of the lay judge
an exemption to the lay judge requirement. See Lay Judges May Not Ty Mob Hit,JAPAN
TIMES, July 18, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn2009718a2.html; see also
Peter Harris, Judging Thy Neighbor: An Exploration of How the Lay Judge System to be
Implemented in 2009 Will Affect Japanese Society, J@PAN INC, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 22, 25. In
fact, the public has consistently cited fear of the defendant as one of the top reasons for
not wanting to serve as a layjudge. Id.
205. See Citizen Judge System, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), May 20, 2009, at 1, available at
5/21/09JWIRE 01:41:24 (Westlaw).
206. See Setsuko Kamiya, Preparationfor Quicker Criminal Trials Enhances Focus,
JAPAN TIMES, May 14, 2009 (quoting Shozo Fujita, Director of the Saibanin Trial
Department of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office).
207. See JOHNSON, supra note 99, at 14-15; see also KEISOHO [Code of Criminal
Procedure], arts. 281-86.
208. See Reynolds, supra note 1.
209. KENPO [Constitution] art. 37 ("In all criminal cases, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal"), translated in 1 EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 1000 (1947).
210. See Kamiya, supra note 3; see also Weber, supra note 12, at 162; Wilson, supra
note 10, at 868-870.
211. SeeJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10.
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system, prosecutors and defense attorneys will need to advocate,
question witnesses in an easily understandable manner, and
incorporate more visual materials into the trial process. 21 2 Lay
judges will have limited, if any, legal training or prior exposure to
the criminal justice system. As such, prosecutors will need to
validate cases through both live testimony and written evidence.
The empowerment of citizen judges constitutes another
significant procedural change. Professional judges will now need
to collaborate with ordinary citizens in determining innocence or
2 13
guilt, and also in assessing a convicted defendant's sentence.
During the trial itself, citizen judges will have the ability to
question witnesses, victims, and defendants. 214 Moreover,
defendants will appear before the court in a more dignified
manner. In stark contrast from past practice, the defendant's
handcuffs and ropes will be removed before the professional and
citizen judges enter the courtroom each day. 215 The defendant
will also wear normal clothing and slippers, unlike the prison
2 16
garb always worn to trial in the past.
b. Duty of Confidentiality for LayJudges
Lay judges are entrusted with the power of government, and
act on behalf of the state. Citizens empanelled as lay judges will
encounter some of the most sensitive issues. Accordingly, Japan
decided to bind lay judges with a strict duty of lifetime
217
confidentiality in the final version of the LayJudge Act.
As for penalties, a bill was originally submitted whereby a lay
judge would face a fine of up to JPY500,000 (approximately
US$5000), imprisonment for up to one year, or both, for leaking
confidential information, either during or after the trial, learned

212. SeeWeber, supra note 12.
213. See LayJudge Act, supra note 7, arts. 6, 9.
214. See id. arts. 56, 58-59.
215. See Fumio Tanaka & Dai Adachi, Lay JudgesAppreciate Help During Trial, DAILY
YOMIURI (Japan), Aug. 8, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 15305283.
216. Accused to be Allowed to Wear Tie in Court, DAILyYOMIURI (Japan), Mar. 22, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 5528568; see also 1st Lay Judge Trial Starts in Tokyo, Reluctance to

ParticipateHigh, supra note 49 (reporting how Mr. Fujii was permitted to wear leather
shoes and free from handcuffs "so as not to give the lay judges the impression the
defendant is guilty simply from his appearance").
217. See Lay Judge Act, arts. 9(2) ("Lay assessors shall not disclose secrets from
deliberation ... or other secrets learned in the exercise of their duties.").
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during the course of jury duty. 218 The bar association and others
voiced their opposition to extreme restriction on a lay judge's
219
ability to openly communicate about their trial experience.
220
They also lobbied to eliminate imprisonment as a penalty.
After vigorous debate, the Diet passed a compromise bill
subjecting lay judges to a maximum fine of up to JPY500,000
(approximately US$5000), six months imprisonment, or both,
for leaking: (1) confidential information learned during jury
service, (2) jury deliberations contents, (3) the opinions or
identities of other lay judge members, or (4) personal opinions
about the panel's findings or weight that should have been
attributed to the evidence. 221 The duty of confidentiality applies
222
both during and after trial.
The confidentiality restriction does not impact the ability of
citizen judges to discuss their personal feelings about their
overall experience as lay judges. For example, citizen judges
participating in Japan's first lay judge trial talked to the media
about their experience in very general terms, mostly focusing on
how they dealt with the pressure and how they slept the night
before rendering a verdict. 223 One juror also shared his thoughts
224
about the sentences sought by the prosecution and defense.
Even in its current form, however, the confidentiality duty
225
imposed upon citizen judges is too strict and should be revised.
Although not expressly stated in the law, it is generally believed
that imprisonment will be limited to cases in which a lay judge
seeks monetary or other personal gain by disclosing
information. 226 However, there are no guarantees that the
government will refrain from strict enforcement.
218. See Press Release,Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 66.
219. See Editorial, Reinstating aJury System, JAPAN TIMES, May 29, 2004, available at
5/28/04JWIRE 23:58:28 (Westlaw); Press Release,Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note
66.
220. See Press Release,Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 66.
221. See Lay Judge Act, supranote 7, arts. 70, 79; Press Release, Japan Fed'n of Bar
Ass'ns, supra note 66.
222. See LayJudge Act, art. 79.
223. See David Johnson, Early Returns from Japan's New Criminal Trials, ASIA-PAC. J.,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.japanfocus.org/-DavidT--Johnson/3212.
224. See Trial Shows Change in Defense Strategy, DAILYYOMIURI (Japan), Aug. 14, 2009
available at 2009 WLNR 15757511.
225. Cf 1st Lay Judge Trial Starts in Tokyo, Reluctance to ParticipateHigh, supranote 49
(quoting experts as criticizing the lifetime secrecy obligations as "too strict").
226. See Press Release,Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 66.
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The confidentiality restriction imposed upon lay judges
reflects serious concerns about the need to protect both the
sanctity of trials and the personal information of individuals
involved in the criminal justice process. The JSRC summarily
stated that it was "natural" that lay judges should have the same
duty of confidentiality as judges in relation to deliberations and
227
secrets learned during jury service.
Japan gives considerable deference to the concept of privacy
in both judicial and private settings. In general, professional
judges are precluded from disclosing information obtained
during their judicial service. 228 Judges generally do not challenge
judicial outcomes in public. In fact, the dissenting opinions of
district court and high court judges are not revealed. 229 Only the
Supreme Court publishes dissenting opinions. 230 Moreover, aside
from the Supreme Court the voting breakdown of cases heard by
multiple justices is not revealed. 23 1 In private contexts, Japan also
affords a significant amount of deference to privacy rights and
has become increasingly sensitive to protecting personal
information. This sensitivity is exemplified by the Personal
Information Protection Law enacted on April 1, 2005,232 which
prohibits the release of collected personal information to third
233
parties absent express consent.

227. See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. IV, pt. 1(2)(b); see
also Tani Nobuyuki, Saiban-in Seido in Kansuru Ikkosatsu: Shihouken no Dokuritsu to Hyougi
no Himitsu no Shiten Kara [A Study on the Saiban'in System: Independence ofJudiciary and
Confidentialityof Deliberations], 10 SEIWA HOUGAKU KENKYUU DAI 155 (2003) (Japan).
228. Saibanshoh6 [Court Act], No. 59 of 1947, art. 75, translated in 2 EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 2010 (2005) (providing that "[d]eliberations of decisions in a panel shall
not be disclosed; provided, however, that the presence of legal apprentices may be
permitted" and that "strict secrecy must be observed with respect to the proceedings of
deliberations, the opinions of each judge and the number of opinions constituting
majority and minority."). An English translation of the Court Act is electronically
available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CACr.pdf.
229. Cf id.

230. See id. art. 11.
231. See Nobuyuki, supranote 227, at 156.

232. See K6jin j6h6 no hogo ni kansuru h6itsu [Act on the Protection of Personal
Information], Law No. 57 of 2003.
233. See Paul Kallender, Japan Tightens PersonalData Protection, PC WORLD (U.S.),

Mar. 29, 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/article/120219/japan-tightens-personal_
data-protection.html. Companies must specify the purpose of collecting information,
obtain consent if the data will be used for any purpose other than they originally stated
purpose, and take measures to prevent theft or leakage. Id.
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The strict confidentiality requirements contained in the Lay
Judge Act reflect the concern that public disclosure of
information related to the deliberations might impede open
discussions among lay judges. 234 This is consistent with worries
expressed when Japan last experimented with juries prior to
World War 11.235 Theoretically, secrecy is intended to foster the

free exchange of ideas during the deliberative process. 236 Open
deliberation and discourse might be stifled if lay judges are aware
that discussions or actions in the deliberation room are subject to
external publication. 237 Additional worries about disclosure
include the potential for challenges to final verdicts, harassment
of lay judges, unreliable disclosures, and potential profiting from
book, television, or movie deals. 23 8 Apart from these traditional

reasons for secrecy, new concerns have been expressed about the
need to protect certain information such as the identity of the
2 39
victims of sex crimes.
c.

Benefits of Citizen Participation

Japan's substantial investment of time, effort, and money in
the lay judge system exemplifies the expectation that greater
citizen involvement in the criminal justice process will stimulate

234. See Citizen Judges in Court, supra note 46. See Mark Levin & Virginia Tice,
Japan's New Citizen Judges: How Secrecy ImperilsJudicial Reform, ASIA-PAC. J., May 9, 2009,
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark D-Levine/3141.
235. See Nobuyuki, supra note 227, at 156. Before World War II, Japan
implemented a jury system for certain criminal cases pursuant to the Jury Act. Baishinhb
LJury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923. However, with the rise of militarism in Japan and the
government's need to control criminal justice, the Jury Act was suspended in 1943.
Baishinh6 no teishi ni kansuru h6ritsu [Act Concerning the Suspension of the Jury Act],
Law No. 88 of 1943 (Japan). For a very interesting translation of a jury guide book
distributed shortly after the first jury system was implemented, see Anna Dobrovolskaia,
The Jury Trial System in Pre-WarJapan:An Annotated Translation of "The Jury Guidebook"
(BaishinTeibiki), 9 AStAN-PAc. L. & POL'YJ. 231,271 (2008).
236. See Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with DeliberativeSecrecy, Juy Independence, and
Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 211 218-19 (2005).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. If confidentiality is not respected, victims may be less inclined to step forward
and report instances of abuse. See generally Privacy Sought for Victim in Rape Trial,JAPAN
TIMES, July 10, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090710a3.html (citing
the lack of protection for the privacy of rape victims because potential jurors not
selected for jury duty are not bound by confidentiality obligations); Alleged Sex Crime
Victims Might Be Named During Jury Selection, JAPAN TIMES, June 5, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090605a9.html.
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many benefits. Although the political and social benefits of
public participation in the Japanese criminal justice system are
still speculative and face many obstacles at this early juncture,
some hope does arise from this monumental change.
Theoretically, direct public participation in the criminal
justice process will reduce the possibility of injustice. Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. once espoused, "injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere." 240 Because "we are caught in an inescapable
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny ...
whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly." 241 The
involvement of a representative group of citizens sitting on ajury
or jury-like tribunal contributes to sound decision-making and
positively affects society in general. 242 Although juries in other
countries are sometimes criticized, studies have shown that jury
verdicts are well-grounded. 243 More specifically, different
viewpoints and the opportunity to debate and discuss trial
evidence among a diverse group increase the likelihood that the
tribunal will thoroughly evaluate and examine all disputed
matters. 244 This collaborative process leads to accurate results that
are grounded in the evidence,2 45 and just findings that are less
susceptible
to
internal
influences
and
established
preconceptions.
If taken seriously, meaningful citizen involvement in the
judicial process is likely to enhance the legal system's legitimacy
and make it more responsive to community values. 246 A criminal
justice system gains credibility when citizens have the opportunity
to engage in the debate, enforcement, and preservation of
societal norms as part of a jury or jury-like body.247 Similar to
240. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in THE
YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS, 427 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
241. Id.
242. See Valerie Hans, Citizens as Legal Decision Makers: An InternationalPerspective,
40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 303, 307-308 (2007).
243. Id. at 308.
244. Id. at 307-08.
245. See id. at 308 (citing to scholarly research that confirms that most U.S. jury
verdicts are soundly based on trial evidence and legal experts (such as the presiding
judge) typically concur with the jury verdicts); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve
Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 206 (1989).
246. See Hans, supra note 242, at 308.
247. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the GrandJuiy, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2333,
2347 (2008) (arguing that measures should be taken to ensure transparency and prevent
criminal justice from being "run behind closed doors by insiders (judges, prosecutors,
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citizen juries, the integration of lay members into mixed
tribunals can also offer a fresh perspective on the matters
addressed at trial. 248 As the first lay judge trials in Japan have just
started, the citizenry has approached the process and new system
249
very seriously and with high regard for their new civic duty.
Furthermore, jury service functions as an educational
vehicle that binds citizens to the state. 250 The U.S. experience
indicates that jury service increases public support for the courts
and promotes civic engagement. 25 1 Jury service stands as an
attribute of citizenship because it offers individuals the
opportunity to better comprehend the law and the judicial
system. 252 Other than voting, jury service is one of the few
activities in which citizens come into direct contact with the
fundamentals of democracy. Moreover, lay judges stand to
personally benefit from a sense of accomplishment, civic pride,
or democratic empowerment.
3.

Role of Defense Counsel

In response to external and internal criticism about
violating international human rights law in this regard, Japan
established a system in October 2006 whereby indigent suspects
charged with certain serious crimes could petition for court25
appointed legal counsel during their preliminary detention.
Crimes covered by this reform included those punishable by

defense attorneys, and law enforcement officials) to the exclusion of outsiders (ordinary
citizens and victims) who are left ill informed about criminal justice").
248. See Hans, supra note 242, at 307-08.
249. See Kamiya, supra note 3.
250. See Hans, supra note 242, at 306.
251. See id. at 306-07 (citing surveys that have "routinely [found] that jurors are
more positive about the courts and the jury system after their service than before. For
example, a national survey of over 8000 jurors who served in sixteen federal and state
courts found that the majority (63%) said that their impression of jury duty was more
favorable after serving.").
252. See Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1927-28 (1992).
253. See Japan Ministry of Justice, Implementation of Comprehensive Legal
Support by the Japan Legal Support Center, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/
issues02.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). Pursuant to this policy change, the Japan Legal
Support Center was established to nominate court-appointed defense attorneys and
secure enough attorneys across the country. Id.; see also David Tharp, Human Rights and
Access to Justice:Japan's Legal Aid Reform as a Model, NIPPON FOUNDATION, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/current/20080307LegalAid2.html.
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death, life imprisonment, or a minimum one-year prison
sentence. 254 In conjunction with the implementation of the lay
judge system, Japan expanded this system in May 2009 to include
serious cases in which a suspect could be subject to the death
penalty, life imprisonment, or a maximum sentence of
imprisonment exceeding three years. 255 This second wave of
expanded rights newly covers crimes involving theft, assault,
professional negligence, fraud, blackmail, and other similar
256
crimes.
Although progress has been made, this system still fails to
provide access to counsel from the moment of arrest, and does
not cover all defendants. Even more significantly, the ability of
suspects to consult with legal counsel remains limited. To the
extent that hired or appointed defense counsel wish to visit with
a suspect, officials typically limit the meeting time.257 Pursuant to
Japanese law, an investigating authority may designate the time,
date, and place of any meeting between suspect and counsel
"when it is necessary for investigation," provided that it does not
"unduly restrict the rights of the suspect to prepare for
defense."2 58Japanese investigators liberally apply this provision to
restrict contact between suspect and counsel. 259 Furthermore,
counsel is not given the opportunity or right to be present during
260
interrogations.

254. See UNHRC, supra note 123, at 8.
255. See id. (remarking that statistics from 2006 indicate that approximately eighty
percent of all suspects were detained for crimes falling within the revised category).
256. SeeJAPAN FED'N BAR ASS'NS, JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS UPDATE
REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTH PERIODIC REPORT OFJAPAN 11 (2008), available at http://

www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/JFBA-Japan94.pdf.
257. See KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 34(3); Kamiya, supra note
149. Even for those who can afford to retain counsel, the Japanese system does not allow
attorneys to be present at interrogations. Soldwedel, supra note 19, at 1435; see also
IWASAWA, supra note 122, at 271-72.
258. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 34(3), translated in 2 EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 2600 (2009). An English translation of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
electronically available at http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/imperia/md/content/rewi/
japanrecht/StPO.pdf.
259. See Vize, supranote 103, at 334.
260. See Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent PaternalismofJapanese CriminalJustice, 80
CAL. L. REv. 317, 338 (1992); Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 184.

2010]

JAPAN'S NEW CRIMINAL JURY TRJAL SYSTEM

523

4. Judicial Reform in Other Areas Affecting the Trial Process
In deference to the citizenry, Japan has attempted to design
its new lay judge trial system in the least burdensome and timeconsuming way possible. Reformers have been particularly
concerned about the negative impact that extended jury service
might impose on work, family, and other responsibilities. 261 Japan
has also implemented new procedures that allow for greater
victim access to criminal trials.
a. Measures Intended to Expedite Criminal Trials
The introduction of citizen judges into the adjudication
process has altered the process in many ways. One aspect of the
trial that remained the same is that the verdict and sentencing
are still integrated within a single proceeding. However, to
minimize the time commitment for citizen jurors and limit costs
related to the use of citizen jurors, Japan has made several
significant procedural modifications to its criminal procedure.
First, lay judge trials will be conducted on consecutive days,
instead of following the past practice in which criminal trials
were discontinuous and conducted over the course of multiple
months, if not years. 262 Legal professionals benefited from the
past trial process because preparations could be spread over
time.263 However, the episodic hearing process tended to only
benefit legal professionals and not the accused. Japan also
instituted a new pretrial "arrangement" procedure to save time
by narrowing the issues presented at trial and facilitating a
productive and systematic trial. 264 Finally, in rolling out the lay
judge trial system, the courts have continuously talked about
limiting the length of trials, 265 so much so that the government
seems more concerned with shortening the trial process than the
defendant's right to a fair and complete trial.
Finally, to expedite lay judge trials and reduce the
anticipated scheduling challenges involving citizen jurors, Japan
amended its Code of Criminal Procedure to include new
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See Kamiya, supra note 206.
See supra note 207.
See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 190.
KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 316-1 to 316-24.
See CitizenJudge System, supra note 205.
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"pretrial arrangement proceedings."' 2 66 The mandatory pretrial
arrangement procedures require counsel to cooperate and
confer in advance of trial. 267 Among other things, the pretrial
arrangement proceedings are intended to clarify the charges and
applicable law, define the allegations and contested issues,
disclose disputed facts and evidence, establish objections related
to evidence, address the use of experts, and establish hearing and
268
trial dates.
b. Movement to Increase and Protect Victim's Rights
In the mid-1990s, calls started in Japan for victim
participation in criminal trials. 269 In response, Japanese
legislators passed the Basic Act on Crime Victims ("Crime Victim
Act") on December 8, 2004.270 The Act sought to respect the
individual dignity of crime victims and foster the development of
policies that protect crime victims' rights and interests. 271
Pursuant to the Act, Japan implemented subsequent measures
enabling victims to recover damages as part of the criminal
process, 272 interject their opinions and information about
266. Keiji sosh6h6 to no ichibu o kaisei suru hbritsu [Act Partially Amending the
Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004; see also Lay Judge Act, supra note 7,
arts. 49-50.
267. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 316-2to 316-12.
268. Id. art. 316-5.
269. See Victims Participationin Criminal Trials May Begin Dec. 1, JAPAN TIMES, Aug.
21, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080821a2.html (stating that calls
for reform started growing after the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
in 2005 that killed twelve and injured more than 5,500 people); see also Toshihiro
Kawaide, Victim's Participation in the Criminal Trial in Japan (2008) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/-sota/info/Papers/kawaide.pdf
(noting that the concern for increasing crime and the social environment were
additional factors).
270. Hanzai higaishato kihonho [Basic Act on Crime Victims], Law No. 161 of
2004. An English
translation of this law is electronically
available at
http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/-sota/info/Papers/Basic%20Law%2on%20Crime%20
Victims%20in%202004.pdf.
271. See id. arts. 3, 9; see also KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 316-33
to 316-39; UNHRC, supra note 123, at 17; Ministry ofJustice, Support for Crime Victims,
etc., http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues09.html (last visitedJan. 24, 2010).
272. See Hanzai higai zaisant6 niyoru higai kaifukukyufukin no shikyu ni kansuru
h6ritsu [Act on the Payment of Damages Recovery Based on the Property of Crime
Victims], Law No. 87 of 2006 (allowing victims to recover their property or value
equivalent to such property); see also Ministry of Justice, supra note 271 (discussing
options such as confiscating stolen property or collecting an equivalent sum of money
from offenders).
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conditions into the parole hearing process, 273 as well as acquire
counseling, support, and updated information from the Public
274
Prosecutors Office and other public agencies.
Most relevant to the criminal trial process, the Diet
amended the Code of Criminal Procedure in June 2007 to
provide victims with the opportunity to actively participate in
criminal trials. 275This revolutionary change became a reality when
it was applied to indictments on December 1, 2008.276 Pursuant
to the amendments, a victim or the victim's bereaved spouse,
lineal relative, brother, or sister (hereinafter collectively
"victim") may actively participate in serious criminal trials by
directly stating opinions, expressing sentiments, or submitting a
written opinion for reading by the presiding judge upon request
to the prosecutor and permission from the court. 277 In addition,
the court has the discretion to permit the victim to sit nearby the
prosecution at trial, question witnesses to challenge the
credibility of statements related to mitigating circumstances,
question the defendant, and state opinions about matters of fact
or law after the prosecutor's closing statement. 278 In essence, the
victim's participation does not relate to fact-finding or evidence,
but rather it relates to personal opinions and mitigating

273. See K6sei hogoh6 [Offenders Rehabilitation Act], Law No. 88 of 2007
(allowing victims to give opinions regarding parole and damages); see also Ministry of
Justice, supra note 271 (discussing measures taken to consider victims' opinions during
the parole hearing process). An English translation of the law is electronically available
at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/ORA.pdf.
274. See Ministry ofJustice, supra note 271 (noting efforts of the Ministry ofJustice
to give victims support and counseling).
275. See Keiji sosh6h6 t6 no ichibu o kaisei suru h6ritsu [Act Partially Amending
Part of the Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 62 of 2004; see also Ministry ofJustice,
supra note 271 (discussing the use outcomes in criminal proceedings for claiming
damages).
276. See Editorial, Crime Victims Get Their Say, JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, availableat
2009 WLNR 525559.
277. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 292-2; see also Kawaide, supra
note 269, at 3 (noting that victim participation is limited to trials for murder, injury
leading to death, rape, sexual assaults, negligence resulting in injury or death, illegal
arrest, and kidnapping); Masami Ito, Crime Victims Bill Enacted,JAPAN TIMES, June 21,
2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070621a4.html (noting judge must
give victims permission to participate during trial).
278. KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 316-33 to 316-38; see also
Editorial, supra note 276 (noting family members of deceased victims may also
participate); Kawaide, supra note 269, at 3-4.
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circumstances. 279 Notably, this active participation occurs before
280
the tribunal reaches its determination of guilt or innocence.
III. THE LA YJUD GE SYSTEM: REALIZING ITS FULL
POTENTIAL
To acquire a full return on the taxpayer dollars and time
invested in the lay judge system, Japan needs to continuously
assess the system's efficiencies and shortcomings. In principle,
Japan needs to achieve justice while simultaneously honoring the
due process rights of all suspects. Japan must also obtain the
understanding, interest, and feeling of its citizenry that
participation in the judicial process is meaningful. 28 1 Where
necessary, further reform should be taken expediently.
Otherwise, the lay judge system might not live up to its potential
andJapan's substantial investment could go to waste.
Monitoring and reassessment are consistent with the JSRC
recommendations, which advise that the initial system should not
be "fixed in stone," but rather should be "flexibly readjusted" to
ensure the establishment of a popular base. 282 Even at this early
stage, it is evident thatJapanese policymakers need to reexamine
and revise several laws and practices that directly affect lay judge
trials. More specifically, Japan needs to reassess the present: (1)
strict confidentiality restrictions on lay judges, (2) secretive
interrogation process, and (3) crime victim participation system.
If adjustments are not made in these areas, Japan runs the risk of
undercutting many of the primary intended benefits of the lay
judge system.
A.

More Transparency: The Need to Release the Shackles of Secrecy
From the DeliberationRoom

To construct a solid foundation for the lay judge system and
engender democratic participation in the judicial process, the
"doors of the courtroom" must be propped open further. This
279. See Kawaide, supra note 269, at 4.
280. See Editorial, supra note 276 (noting that victims can question the defendant
after the prosecutors' closing argument and sentencing recommendation).
281. Cf Hans, supra note 242, at 308 ("All the work on mixed tribunals thus far
confirms that lay citizens are highly likely to agree with the legal expert judges who
decide cases with them.").
282. SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch IV, pt. 1.

2010]

JAPAN'S NEW CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL SYSTEM

527

will enable Japanese society to truly see how the law and judicial
process function. Real transparency and complete justice cannot
be sufficiently achieved unless Japan is willing to modify or repeal
the lifetime restriction on citizen judges' freedom to speak about
certain trial-related matters. The lay judge system needs to shed
its shackles of secrecy and allow a greater degree of post-verdict
disclosure by citizen judges.
1.

The Need to Open the Door: Increased Ability to Disclose

Secrecy during trials protects the sanctity of the
proceedings. 283 During a trial, public participation and
confidence in the system are encouraged if jury deliberations
remain secret. 28 4 Closed-door deliberations, moreover, encourage
open and frank discussion in the jury room and safeguard against
external influence. 285 After the trial, continuing confidentiality
may serve to protect lay judges from harassment, encourage the
finality of judgments, eliminate fishing expeditions to impeach
verdicts, diminish the reluctance of jury service, and stimulate
room. 286
in the jury deliberation
open discussions
Notwithstanding, the need for strict post-trial secrecy is
questionable except in extraordinary cases. For the reasons
detailed below, Japan should distinguish between the role of
secrecy during trial versus the imposition of a lifetime ban on
post-trial disclosure regarding deliberations and the trial
experience.
The goals underlying the establishment of the lay judge
system include the promotion of transparency, access to the legal
system, and free flow of information. The JSRC advanced reforms
that would make the justice system easier to use, easier to
understand, and more reliable for the general public. 28 7 On its
283. See generally Courselle, supra note 236.
284. Alison Markovitz, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1508
(2001).
285. See generally Courselle, supra note 236.
286. See David N. Averyt, Paying FormerJurorsfor Consultation on a Retrial: Suspect
Tactic or Good Lawryering?, 57 ALA. L. REV. 853, 858-59 (2006) (citations omitted); Nicole
B. Cdsarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury System, 25 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 499, 507-600 (2003); Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct,Jury Interviews,
and the FederalRules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusionary Principalof Rule 606(b) Justified?.,
66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 512 (1988); Holly M. Stone, Post-TrialContact with Court Members: A
CriticalAnalysis,38 A.F. L. REv. 179, 181-82 (1994).
287. SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supranote 25, ch. IV, pt. 2.
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face, however, the permanent duty of post-trial confidentiality is
inconsistent with these goals. Even more significantly,
constitutional considerations dictate a relaxation of the strict
secrecy standards imposed by the LayJudge Act.
By constitutional mandate, trials in Japan are open to the
public. 288 Further, the new lay judge system is expressly intended
to educate. 2 9 Although it is a challenge to decide how to best
strike a balance between the competing interests of
confidentiality versus transparency, access to information,
education, and freedom of expression, it is evident that the doors
to the courtroom should not be sealed once deliberations are
finished. Moreover, precious judicial resources should not be
diverted to monitoring or prosecuting citizen judges desiring to
discuss, justify, or opine about the tribunal's decisions.
Systemic transparency and open post-trial disclosure are
essential. At minimum, lay judges should have the post-trial
option to state their opinions and impressions about the
tribunal's deliberations, findings, and voting breakdown. In a
Japanese context, the importance of open disclosure is amplified
by the fact that the lay judge system is still in its infancy. The
general public and legal professionals alike will benefit from
greater access to information. Legal reformers and scholars can
also gain greater insight into potential improvements as well as
the system's strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, the strict
confidentiality restrictions should be relaxed or eliminated. Posttrial disclosure by willing citizen judges will increase
transparency, further public education about the criminal justice
system, enhance learning opportunities for legal counsel, and
guard against corruption.
a. Current Restrictions Are Constitutionally Unjustified
The current strict lifetime confidentiality restrictions
infringe the citizen judges' right to free expression and speech.
Article 21 of the constitution of Japan specifies that freedom of
speech and all other forms of expression be guaranteed. 290 Lay
288. KENPO [Constitution], arts. 37, 82.
289. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234.
290. KENPO [Constitution], art. 21, translated in 1 EHS LAW BuLL. SER. no. 1000
(1947) ("Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other
forms of expression are guaranteed.").
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judge expression should be free from governmental limitation
after the conclusion of a trial. An individual's right of expression
stands as the bedrock of any democracy, 29 1 and should be
respected to the fullest extent possible. The Supreme Court of
Japan has acknowledged that the freedom of expression "must
be respected as an especially important right in democratic
society." 292 By prohibiting lay judges from speaking about the
trial itself,2 93 the Diet has restricted free speech. Although lay
judges certainly should not be forced to speak about their
experience, they should be free to exercise their constitutionally
guaranteed rights and speak about their experience if they so
choose.
The criminal justice system and related activities are core
governmental functions and should not be shrouded in
secrecy. 294 Openness is the key to responsible government and
justice. Based on this premise, the Japanese constitution specifies
that criminal trials and verdicts are open to the public, except in
extraordinary cases. 295 There should be nothing to hide,
particularly after the conclusion of a trial.
The most tenable justification for impeding post-trial free
speech stems from the general public welfare exception in the
Constitution. Specifically, article 13 stipulates that an individual's
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall be the
supreme consideration in governmental affairs "to the extent
296
[that such rights do] not interfere with the public welfare."
The Japanese Supreme Court has stated that article 21 "does not
291. SeeJean-Franois Flauss, The European Court of Human Rights and the Freedom of
Expression, 84 IND. L.J. 809, 814 (2009).
292. See Kuriyama Reiko et al., 62 KEISHO 5 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2008).
293. See, e.g., Setsuko Kamiya, Lay Judges Relieved Case Over But Enthusiastic About
Experience, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15296161 (reporting on

press conference involving first set of lay judges and restrictions placed on what they
could discuss).
294. See Eugene R. Sullivan, The Great Debate V A Debate on JudicialReform, England
v. United States, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 338-39 (2001).

295. KENPO [Constitution], arts. 37, 82. Article 82 sets forth the exception for
private trials. More specifically, private trials might be possible where a court
unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals. Id.
However, trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press, or cases wherein the
rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of the Constitutions must always be
conducted publicly. Id.
296. KENPO [Constitution], art. 13, translated in 1 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 1000
(1947).
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guarantee freedom of expression unconditionally, but rather it
allows necessary and reasonable restrictions for public
welfare."2 97 Therefore, the public welfare may trump individual
rights in certain limited circumstances.
Even though individual rights are not absolute, the public is
well served by transparency and free expression.2 98 Applying the
above standard, the restriction on post-trial lay judge speech is.
unnecessary and unreasonable in light of public welfare
considerations. Post-trial access to information better serves the
public interest as it promotes responsible deliberations, curbs the
possibility of undue influence from professional judges, and
enables public education about the new lay judge system.
Because criminal trials are open to the public, sensitive
information related to particular individuals will be publicly
disclosed through the evidence presented at trial. As such, a
citizen juror's expression is unlikely to "unduly infringe" upon
another person's right to privacy. Further, the proceedings will
not be undermined through post-trial disclosure. Rather, the
professional and citizen judges are more apt to issue quality
verdicts and sentences given the prospect of subsequent public
scrutiny.
Accordingly, the strict duty of confidentiality currently
imposed on lay judges should be removed or relaxed. To assess
criminal penalties to lay judges commandeered into public
service is an unreasonable restriction on the guarantee of free
speech, 299 and does not serve the public welfare. To the extent
that Japanese policymakers want to retain a post-trial duty of
confidentiality in some form, it should be drafted on a more
narrowly tailored basis and subject to stricter scrutiny. Japan
could limit restricted speech to "extraordinary cases" determined
297. See Kuriyama Reiko et al., 62 KEISHO 5 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2008).
298. See generally AM. BAR ASS'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005),
http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (concluding that the public
welfare is supported by transparency and a juror's freedom to speak). The American
Jury Project, was established by the American Bar Association in recognition of the need
to constantly refine and improve jury practice. Id. It further concluded that a juror
should ordinarily have the right to discuss a case with anyone, including legal counsel or
the media, once the terms ofjury service have expired. Id.
299. The Supreme Court of Japan has never used strict scrutiny to strike a statute
restricting free speech. See Naoki Kanaboshi, Competent Persons' ConstitutionalRight to
Refuse Medical Treatment in the U.S. and Japan: Application to Japanese Law, 25 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 5, 61 (2006).
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by the presiding judge on a case-by-case basis. For example,
narrowly tailored restrictions might be placed on disclosures
related to the identity of sex crime victims.
a. Fines and Imprisonment Are Too Severe
The penalties related to the lay judges' duty of
confidentiality 300 are too severe and should be removed or
reduced, regardless of whether enforcement is pursued. If lay
judges face the specter of jail time or monetary fines, it
significantly increases the likelihood that the judicial process will
remain mired in silence. If lay judges are unable to freely discuss
their experiences after sitting behind the bench, the system will
remain shrouded in secrecy3 01 and the incentive to serve as a lay
judge will decrease.30 2 Although the government has provided
verbal assurances that citizen judges may discuss their feelings
and impressions about serving as a lay judges, 30 3 citizen judges
are less likely to freely and openly discuss information that might
be helpful to understanding the verdict, the system, and the
judicial process in general. Moreover, abnormalities and
indiscretions are more likely to be concealed.
The imposition of criminal penalties against citizens
unjustifiably exceeds the burdens placed on professional judges.
Professional judges are life-long civil servants who willingly chose
to serve as judges. They have professional training and
experience to guide them through the various challenges
associated with criminal trials and deliberations. 304 In contrast, a
300. See supra notes 218-22.
301. Not only does the resolution of criminal trials generally remain outside of the
public eye, but the implementation of the death penalty is hidden from sight. See David
T. Johnson, Japan's Secretive Death Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, Justifications, and
Meanings, 7 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'YJ. 62, 70-71 (2006).
302. See Eiji Yamamura, What Discourages Participation in the Lay Judge System
(saiban'in seido) of Japan?An Interaction Effect Between the Secrecy Requirement and Social
Network,
(MPRA
Paper
No.
15920,
June
26,
2009),
available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15920/1/MPRA.paper_15920.pdf;
see also supra
note 46 (indicating low public willingness to participate as a layjudge).
303. Editorial, Lay Judge's Duty of Confidentiality, Mental Anguish Need Further
Consideration,MAINICHIJAPAN (Japan), Nov. 25, 2009, available at http://mdn.mainichi.jp/
perspectives/editorial/news/2009ll25p2aOOmOnaOlOOOOc.html
(describing the ability of lay
judges to discuss their feelings during post-trial press conferences, and noting the
frequent interruptions by the clerk courts instructing lay judges not to answer based on
confidentiality restrictions).
304. See Levin & Tice, supranote 234.
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citizen is compelled to serve as a lay judge, and does not have the
training or experience to deal with the exposure to the graphic
nature of a serious criminal trial in an isolated bubble.30 5 At a
minimum, citizens should be provided with the freedom to seek
comfort and share their experiences with family members and
close friends. It is inequitable to threaten lay judges serving in a
mandatory capacity with criminal penalties, particularly when
professional judges do not face imprisonment or fine. 30 6 Civic
service should be rewarded. It should not be greeted with the
threat of jail time, the loss of constitutional rights, or even
significant fines.
One of the keys to a successful lay judge system is public
support. Threats and uncertainty achieve the opposite result. As
such, Japan needs to remove or reduce the severe penalties
associated with post-trial disclosure. As a middle ground, the Lay
Judge Act might be amended to penalize citizen jurors only in
the event that they leak information during trial or disclose
sensitive information obtained through the deliberation process
after trial to a third party in exchange for money or something of
comparable value.
b. Health of Citizen Jurors Merits Consideration
Although the new reforms are sensitive to the employment
commitments, transportation requirements, childcare issues, and
various other needs of lay judges,30 7 the health and well-being of
these civic servants merits further consideration. If citizen judges
cannot share their experiences with third parties after the trial,
their mental well-being may be jeopardized. Carrying the mental
yoke associated with gruesome information revealed in serious
felony cases and the potential stress posed by jury service can be
detrimental. More specifically, lay judges exposed to graphic
305. Id.
306. Id. (emphasizing that Japanese career judges are constrained only by the
confidentiality provisions in the Court Act of 1947 and only face internal sanctioning
based on their employment status asjudges).
307. See Lay Judge Act, supra note 7, art. 16(vii) (listing various exclusions from
service); see also First Lay Judges Sent Summons/6 lay judges, 3 Reserves to Be Chosenfor Trial
over Tokyo Murder, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), June 18, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
11588684 (describing how the Matsuyama District Court may excuse citizen judges if
their civic service interferes with work connected with local specialties including pearls,
yellowtails, mandarin oranges, and rice harvesting).
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evidence, distressing testimony, and contentious proceedings
could suffer
disturbing reactions
such
as
"vicarious
traumatization" and other adverse reactions. 308 In fact, studies of
jury and lay judge systems in other countries have found that
prohibiting jurors from communicating their trial experience
30 9
with others can be detrimental to their health.
In recognition of this potential problem, the Supreme Court
of Japan has announced a program to provide traumatized lay
judges with subsidized psychological counseling and a twentyfour-hour counseling hotline. 310 By implication, the government
does not intend to prosecute lay judges seeking counseling
services and communicate about their experience. However,
these measures do not go far enough. The Lay Judge Act should
be modified to expressly recognize the unrestricted right for lay
judges to consult with psychologists, counselors, and other
medical specialists. For their mental well-being, lay judges should
be expressly allowed to freely speak about their concerns or
traumatic experiences with any mental health professional
member of their choice. Lay judges should be able to seek
comfort from their family members and friends also.
c.

Silence Undermines the Express Goals and Public Value of
Judicial Reform

To promote citizen participation in the Japanese justice
system, it is essential that participants can freely convey their first308. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234 (explaining phenomenon of "vicarious
traumatization" (citing Theodore B. Feldman & Roger A. Bell, Crisis Debriefing of aJuly
After a Murder Trial, 42 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 79 (1991))); see Editorial, Lay
Judge System Should Be Monitored,Improved, DAILYYOMIURI (Japan), Aug. 7, 2009, available
at 2009 WLNR 15195481 (describing the psychological effect on first panel of lay
judges). A lay judge could suffer from trauma for a few days, months, or years
depending on the circumstances and utilization of professional mental health services.
Levin & Tice, supra note 234. The possible symptoms of victim traumatization are
emotional distress, fatigue, irritability, sleep disturbance, eating problems, intrusive
thoughts, and some lay judges could even lose interest in sex or experience physical
ailments such as hives, chest pains, and ulcers. Id.
309. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234.
310. See Traumatized Lay Judges to Get Free Counseling,DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), June
19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 11660238 (describing how the Supreme Court ofJapan
will establish a system to provide psychological counseling to layjudges traumatized after
serving in trials at no cost). The Supreme Court will also establish a free twenty-fourhour counseling hotline for lay judges and pay for a maximum of five counseling
sessions with clinical psychologists. Id.
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time experience to future generations of lay judges. Citizens not
only need to understand how the participants felt during the
process, but also how the criminal justice and deliberative
process played out. 3 1 As suggested earlier, 312 strict secrecy is
counterproductive to the judicial reform effort given that the
pronounced goals underlying judicial reform are transparency
3 13
and education.
In certain cases, it may be important to preserve the privacy
of victims, witnesses, and even the accused. Such importance is
diminished in criminal trials, however, because the constitution
mandates open trials.3 14 Therefore, the dangers associated with
disclosing the content of the trial and deliberative process are
significantly diminished.
As with a complex mathematical equation, there is merit to
everyone having access to the question, the solution, as well as
the methodology and process used to reach the solution. If the
Japanese public has access to information about the
methodology and process used to reach a verdict, this increases
the likelihood of understanding. Having access to only the
question (trial) and answer (verdict) does not necessarily further
the educational process. If the lay judges' tongues are tied, the
public will be unable to see the process used to carefully resolve
each case. The benefits associated with readily available
information about how and why a tribunal reached a conclusion
will be diluted or lost.
Drawing upon the U.S. experience, the U.S. Supreme Court
has emphasized that access to criminal trials is important, in part
because "results alone" cannot satisfy the public's need to
understand the criminal justice system. 315 If a trial is concealed
from public view, "an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction
that the system at best has failed, and at worst has been
corrupted." 316 Pursuant to the Lay Judge Act, a citizen judge
desiring or willing to speak about certain subjects after the trial is
prohibited from doing so. 317 As such, the system is unnecessarily
311. SeeIwata, supranote 41; Levin & Tice, supra note 234.

312. See supra Part III A.3.a.
313. See supra note 2727.
314.

See supra note 295.

315. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
316. Id.
317. See LayJudge Act, supra note 7, arts. 9, 70.
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exposed to negative reaction and detrimental repercussions. To
guard against failure or corruption and facilitate understanding,
the deliberation process should be open and subject to post-trial
analysis. Without sufficient access to information, opposition may
result over a controversial verdict or sentence. Left to
speculation, the public may not understand valid reasoning for a
particular result. In contrast, if lay judges can freely explain the
reasoning behind a verdict or sentence after the conclusion of a
trial, it will lessen the frequency or intensity of public doubt
about the judicial process. 318 As such, Japan should explore ways
to increase the amount of information that lay judges can openly
disclose, as opposed to adhering to the entrenched practice of
keeping information secluded behind closed doors.
Accordingly, access to information will likely help reduce
current opposition to the lay judge system. Public opinion polls
leading up to the implementation of the lay judge system leaned
heavily against participation. 319 By allowing broad post-trial
dissemination of information, the citizenry can observe the
process, become familiar with the system, and comprehend the
value of citizen participation. 320 Increased access to information
about the process will both alleviate potential anxiety and
improve chances that the populous will embrace the new
321
system.
Another reason for relaxing the life-long restriction on the
freedom to speak about trial deliberations relates to
interpersonal social networks that play an important role within
the Japanese societal structure. 322 In its current form, the Lay
Judge Act discounts the importance and support provided by
social networks in Japan. Lay judges belonging to personal social
networks face the moral dilemma of deviating from traditional
norms due to the inability to openly discuss feelings and
323
experiences with other members of their social networks.
Unless the current restrictions are modified or repealed, lay
judges face the risk of alienation from their social networks
318. See Cisarez, supra note 286, at 592.
319. See supra note 46.
320. See Minoru Matsutani, Media Fret Risk of BiasingLay Judges,JAPAN TIMES, May
15, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090515a3.html 300.
321. Id.
322. See Yamamura, supra note 302, at 7-8.
323. See id.
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during potentially trying times. To avoid statutory penalties,
324
citizen judges will need to subordinate their social networks.
Not only can this be uncomfortable for the citizen judges, but it
can also undermine invaluable support for the new system. Social
networks and personal interaction enhance grass-roots support
for civic participation. 325 In theory, social networks should
encourage citizens to serve as lay judges because interactive
discussion among family and friends increases learning and
promotes efficiencies. 326 If citizen judges have reservations about
or restrictions on their ability to communicate with their social
network, public support and group understanding may be
hindered. As such, the relaxation of current confidentiality
restrictions would be consistent with Japanese culture and
society.
Allowing the lay judges to speak in detail after trial will not
have the negative consequences envisioned by advocates of the
strict confidentiality restrictions. 327 By way of comparison, U.S.
jurors may freely speak about the deliberative process in most
cases once a verdict has been rendered. 328 If extraordinary
considerations exist, courts possess the discretion to impose a gag
order or narrowly restrict juror speech.32 9 Research shows that
U.S. jurors are generally willing to voluntarily speak with the
press. 330 When U.S. jurors have spoken with the press, they
typically endeavor to explain the rationale underlying the
verdict. 331 Additionally, they commented on the deliberative
process used to reach a verdict, their emotions in serving as a
juror, the ease or difficulty of decision-making, their impressions
of the system, instances of misconduct, and their evaluation of

324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 14-15.
327. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234, at 5 (explaining the arguments and concerns
of authorities who advocate strict confidentiality restrictions).
328. See Sullivan, supra note 294, at 336-38 (quoting an excerpt from Judge
Kenneth Starr on his belief for the disclosure ofjury deliberations in the United States);
see also Cdsarez, supra note 286, at 505 (detailing the extent of First Amendment rights).
329. See Cdsarez, supra note 286, at 505 (explaining the proof needed to restrict
jurors' free speech).
330. See id. at 553 (analyzing 761 articles from the Houston Chronicle between
1985 to 2002, in which jurors were approached or independently contacted by the

press).
331. See id.
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the lawyers and judges.3 3 2 Personal, private, or inappropriate
333
disclosures about fellowjurors have been extremely rare.
Access to juror experiences and observations has generally
been a positive experience in the United States, 334 and a valid
argument can be made that Japan would have a similarly positive
experience as well. Opponents of broader disclosure also
contend that fair trials are attainable only ifjudges can deliberate
without fear of subsequent exposure of their identity or
opinions. 3 5 The argument follows that sensitive or shy lay judges
will prefer to hide their opinions and feelings rather than risk
subsequent public disclosure. 336 The argument further proposes
that if discussions were chilled by the prospect of disclosure, then
incomplete deliberations would result in injustice. 33 7 The U.S.
experience shows otherwise. 338 In a Japanese context, the
likelihood of chilled opinions is also remote given that public
attacks against fellow lay judges would be unlikely. 33 9 Culturally,
citizen judges are more likely to focus on personal opinions and
group dynamic rather than singling out other members serving
on the tribunal. The benefits of disclosure outweigh the minimal
risk of chilled deliberations. To reduce the likelihood of any
chilling effect, Japan might consider lifting the restriction against
disclosing the content of jury deliberations and vote tallies, while
retaining restrictions on the identification of other judges or
individual conduct. This would mask attribution to specific
individuals, while providing society with useful information. It
would also preserve the implicit good faith obligation that the
citizen judges and professional judges have to each other.

332. See id. at514-46.
333. See id. at 545.
334. See Sullivan, supra note 294, at 336.
335. See Csarez, supra note 286, at 553; Levin & Tice, supranote 234.
336. See Cisarez, supra note 286, at 553.
337. Id.
338. See Sullivan, supra note 294, at 338-39 (citing to a two-year study conducted by
the Connecticut Supreme Court involving a fifteen-member panel that concluded that
post-verdict juror interviewing did not chill discussions in the deliberation room or
negatively influence the jury deliberation process (citing Lauren A. Borsa, Task Force:
Post-VerdictInterviews Not a Problem, NEWS-TIMES (Danbury, Conn.), July 11, 1996)).
339. Cf Cdsarez, supra note 286, at 553 (explaining that chilling in the jury room
debate would only occur if interviewed jurors identified other jurors by name and
exposed highly personal or unflattering comments made by them, or revealed
statements that would subject the juror to discomfort, ridicule, or derision).
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d. Value of Disclosure to Attorneys and Defendant
In any legal system, an attorney serves as an advocate for his
or her clients. Japan is no exception to this fundamental concept.
For a trial lawyer, the reaction of the judges and jury to case
theories and substantive arguments is important. Both
prosecutors and defense attorneys have a legitimate interest in
speaking with willing lay judges after a trial for evaluation
purposes. 340 In relation to a specific case, both sides may wish to
consult with willing lay judges to assess the possible merits and
demerits of pursuing an appeal. They may also desire to confirm
whether any improprieties occurred in the deliberation process.
Additionally, a convicted defendant has an interest in confirming
these matters and obtaining a better understanding about the
reasoning underlying any conviction.
On a personal level, counsel may also seek information
related to improving their trial advocacy skills. Research affirms
that a fact-finder not only considers attorney presentation and
style when deciding a case, but also places a level of importance
on the presentation. 341 Although this research was conducted
based on the U.S. framework, it is reasonable to conclude that
the lay judges will also similarly have positive or negative
reactions to the presentation methods and styles of Japanese
attorneys. In fact, the JFBA and Ministry of Justice have reached
similar conclusions and expended significant sums on training
attorneys about the art of trial advocacy. 342 Early comments from
citizen judges in Japan further confirm the importance of
343
presentation methods.
An attorney possesses a great interest in understanding how
his or her case theory, evidence, arguments, presentation, and
style are received. 344 Although training sessions, mock trials, or

340. See Averyt, supra note 286, at 858 (noting that post-verdict interviews can be
very useful where the lay judge system is still developing despite the fact that lay judges
could have difficulties recalling their experience, perceive events incorrectly, or even lie
about their experience).
341. See id.
342. See Setsuko Kamiya, Day of Public Reckoning in Criminal Trial Process Looms,
JAPAN TIMES, May 12, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090512a3.html;
see alsoJAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASS'NS, supra note 10.

343. See Tanaka & Adachi, supra note 215 (commenting that graphics and other
visual displays made the presentations more understandable).
344. See Averyt, supra note 286, at 858.
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study are helpful for attorneys, it cannot substitute for direct
feedback about actual performance in the intense environment
presented by a live courtroom. 345 By acquiring feedback from lay
judges who are willing to discuss their experience, the entire
system can benefit from improvements in evidence presentation,
346
trial advocacy methods, and attorney understanding.
e.

Opening the Doors Fosters Accountability and Prevents
Injustice

Secrecy increases the risk of misconduct or masked bias.
Facilitating transparency will thus foster accountability and avoid
potential injustices among all courtroom actors. Because lay
judges exercise governmental power, "their ability to speak
3 47
promotes a reasonable and responsible exercise of power."
When citizen judges carry out such an important governmental
function, there is merit in the citizens knowing this function will
not remain a mystery.3 48 If a tribunal's actions are subject to
public commentary and opinion, it reasons that the tribunal will
apply significant thought, substantial care, and diligent efforts in
reaching a verdict. Social science explains that the prospect of
having to explain the rationale behind a conviction or acquittal
encourages quality and thoughtful deliberations. 349 Increased
transparency will encourage the professional and citizen judges
0
to make thoughtful decisions and reach a defensible verdict. 35
Public scrutiny will also decrease the likelihood that a verdict will
be influenced by prejudice or bias.
There is also a significant concern that professional judges
will utilize their positions of esteem and respect to exert undue
influence over lay judges during the deliberations. 351 Although
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See Sullivan, supra note 294, at 338 (excerptingJudge Kenneth Starr).
348. See id.
349. See Cdsarez, supranote 286, at 567.
350. See id.
351. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 852; David Allen & Chiyoda Sumida, A New Order
in Japan's Courts, STARS & STRIPES (Pacific ed., Wash., D.C.), June 2, 2009, available at
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63030;
see also Anderson &
Nolan, supra note 19, at 990 (expressing hope that judges allow for meaningful
participation by lay citizens); Bloom, supra note 19, at 62-63 (same); Parry, supra note 53
(paraphrasing judges as describing the system as "destructive tinkering"). This concern
is specifically recognized in the Lay Judge Act in that professional and lay judges are
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the system contains several checks and controls such as the
involvement of multiple professional judges 352 and the
35 3
requirement to delineate the reasoning underlying all verdicts,
the potential for impropriety exists. One cannot discount the
possibility of implicit or express coercion by professional judges,
particularly where junior judges tend to give considerable
deference to senior judges. 3 4 To the extent that such tendencies
exist, secrecy will facilitate such coercion. To minimize potential
misconduct and avoid injustice to the accused, the accuracy of a
verdict should outweigh the secrecy of the tribunal's
deliberations. Any suspicion that an internal or external force
has interfered with the administration of justice should not be
355
tolerated.
In its current form, the Lay Judge Act does not expressly
exempt lay judges from punishment if they report suspected
irregularities or improper conduct encountered during the trial
or deliberation process. 5 6 It is conceivable that a lay judge could
witness another tribunal member violate court rules, or
experience undue pressure from a professional judge. Distorted
deliberations, erroneous guidance, and impropriety should be
subject to public scrutiny. The threat of serious penalty could
inhibit the disclosure of such abuses. Absent the express right to
report suspected misconduct or abuses, lay judges will be less
inclined to divulge or share information about undue influence
357
or a potential miscarriage ofjustice.
Even if serious misconduct is the exception in Japanese
court proceedings, impropriety cannot be tolerated under any
condition. Accordingly, measures should be implemented to

entrusted to decide freely based on the strength of the evidence. Lay Judge Act, supra
note 7, art. 62. The Act further requires that professional judges take measures to ensure
that lay assessors voice their opinions. Id. art. 67.
352. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234, at 8.
353. Id.
354. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234. See generally Bruce Wallace, Japan Urged to
Come Clean on Confessions, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/
may/12/world/fg-confessionsl2 (reciting account of one junior judge's difficulties in
dealing with a senior judge in a murder case involving a coerced confession).
355. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892) (holding that
communications between jurors and third persons, witnesses, or the courtroom officer
invalidate a verdict).
356. See generally LayJudge Act, supra note 7.
357. See Levin & Tice, supra note 234.
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enable lay judges to freely discuss possible instances of
misconduct or impropriety. In sum, policymakers should amend
the Lay Judge Act to include a mechanism to enable whistle
blowing and provisions that protect lay judges who seek to raise
or correct an impropriety. Lay judges must be able to speak
about the deliberations with the assurance that the government
will not punish them for blowing the whistle on an esteemed
358
governmental official or fellow lay judge.
f.

Concerns Should Not Be Overblown

By publicly expressing opinions or explaining the rationale
underlying a verdict or sentence, lay judge disclosures will not
destabilize the legal system or undermine final judgments. 359 This
has been demonstrated by the U.S. experience with juror
disclosures. 36° In the United States, while entities external to the
tribunal such as attorneys, family, friends, or the media may
inquire about the nature or content ofjury deliberations, the law
prohibits any formal inquiry into the deliberation. 361 This process
has enhanced the judicial system's credibility. 362 Also, the
voluntary nature of jury secrecy has been a key component to
building public respect for the jury system. 363 The ability to not
comment also empowers jurors to resist external pressures to
364
decide the case based on the strength of the evidence.
Dissenting opinions should not subvert the process either.
The Japanese Supreme Court publishes majority and dissent
opinions. 365 When the highest judicial power in the land
358. See Setsuko Kamiya, Legal Pros Expecting A Lot From Lay Judges, JAPAN TIMES,
June 17, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090617a3.html.
359. See supra note 234-238.
360. See Sullivan, supra note 294, at 338-39 (quoting Judge Kenneth Starr); see also
NancyJ. King, Ethics for the Ex-Juror: GuidingFormerJurorsAfter the Trials, inJURYETHICS:
JUROR CONDUCT ANDJURY DYNAMICS 222 (John Kleinig &James P. Levine eds., 2005).
361. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 273 (2003) (stating
the well-established principle under U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 606 that jurors may
not be impeached on their verdicts following the conclusion of a trial).
362. See King, supra note 360, at 220-21.
363. See id. at 222. But see Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States:
Two Common CriminalJustice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW
27, 116 (2004).
364. See King, supra note 360, at 221; see also Marcus & Waye, supra note 363, at 115
(explaining that juror secrecy is designed to keep jurors anonymous and free from
corruption).
365. See supra note 230.
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disagrees, an inherent danger exists that the stability of law might
be undermined. 366 Notwithstanding, debate and discussion does
not destabilize, but rather stimulates democratic debate and
fosters potential improvements in the system. The existence of
multiple opinions reflects that the tribunal reached a decision
3 67
only after giving due thought and consideration to the issues.
Based on the Japanese Supreme Court's living example, it
reasons that open discussion and debate among the lay judges
and professional judges would not harm the finality of
judgments. Conversely, it would reflect due consideration and
care to all serious criminal cases, and further the goals of
transparency and public education.
Advocates of a strict confidentiality standard might discount
the U.S. experience, in favor of the positions taken by the United
Kingdom ("U.K.") or Australia. In the U.K., jury deliberations
transpire in a black box. Jurors are held in contempt of court for
revealing information about "any particulars of statements made,
opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by
members of a jury in the course of their deliberations or after the
case is over."3 68 Unlike Japan, however, U.K. law expressly allows
a juror to reveal information about impropriety within the jury
room. 369 The U.K. and Australian contempt penalties are also
based, at least in part, on concerns about public scrutiny of
compromise verdicts in a system where unanimous consent is
necessary. 370 If jurors publicly discuss the deliberation process,
366. See Nobuyuki, supra note 227, at 156.
367. Id. at 156-57.
368. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c.49, § 8(1) (U.K.) (stating that "it is a
contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made,
opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the
course of their deliberations in any legal proceeding."); see also Oliver Luft, The Times
Convicted of Contempt of Courtfor Report on Jury's Disagreement: The Times andJury Foreman
Revealed 'Secrets of Jury Room,' GUARDIAN, May 13, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2009/may/ 13/the-times-jury-foreman-contempt-court.
369. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c.49, § 8(2) (U.K.) (permitting disclosures "in
the proceedings in question for the purpose of enabling the jury to arrive at their
verdict, or in connection with the delivery of that verdict, or in evidence in any
subsequent proceedings for an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to
the jury in the first mentioned proceedings"). Criminal trial verdicts must be unanimous
in the United Kingdom and Australia, and commentators have expressed concern that
openness would reveal compromise as opposed to unanimity among jurors in reaching a
verdict. See Marcus & Waye, supra note 363, at 95.
370. See Marcus & Waye, supra note 363, at 95 (observing that commentators have
expressed concern that openness would reveal compromise as opposed to unanimity
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worries exist that the public might negatively conclude that
unanimous
findings
actually
constitute
negotiated
compromises.3 7 ' In a Japanese context, however, the lay judge
system provides for a verdict by majority vote, 72 so the prospect
of negative societal reaction to a "compromise verdict" is
inapposite in Japan.
Moreover, the U.K. laws regarding juror secrecy have
recently come under attack. Concerns exist about the lack of
juror accountability and jurors are often second-guessed about
their decisions.3 7 3 Also, there is an increasing recognition that
post-trial openness about jury deliberations a healthier option for
the long-term success of the judicial process. 374 Not only does
secrecy reflect systemic weakness, but the ability to access
information helps to identify strengths and weaknesses, as well as
to facilitate a system that meets the needs of all stakeholders. 375
2.

Resolving Concerns: Increased Ability to Disclose

The public welfare is well-served by transparency and open
access to information. In recognition of individual constitutional
rights, citizen judges deserve the freedom to express their
thoughts and opinions. Accordingly, Japan should revise article
79 of the Lay Judge Act and permit citizen judges to openly
discuss a case with anyone, including legal counsel or the media,
once the terms ofjury service have expired.
To alleviate privacy-related concerns, restrictions against the
identification of citizen judges or attribution of particular
statements or opinions to specific members of the tribunal may
be left in place. This should diminish concerns about "chilling"
frank deliberations or post-trial harassment. At the conclusion of
a trial, the courts can easily instruct lay judges about the
appropriate boundaries of discussing the case and verdict with
third parties, if they decide to exercise their free speech rights
and speak with family, friends, lawyers, the community, or even
among jurors in unanimous verdict jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and
Australia).
371. See id. at 95-96.
372. SeeWeber, supra note 12, at 160-61; Wilson, supranote 9, at 846-847.
373. See King, supranote 360, at 221; Marcus & Waye, supra note 363, at 115.
374. SeeJohn D. Jackson et al., The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow
ofa Troubled Past,62 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 231-32 (1999).
375. SeeJackson et al., supra note 374, at 231-32.
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the media. Such instruction can guard against excessive or
inappropriate disclosures. If special considerations warranting
continued secrecy exist in a certain case, Japanese courts can be
afforded the discretion to judiciously employ a gag order. This
can be done on a case-by-case basis.
Further, to protect citizen judges against harassment,
policymakers can develop mechanisms whereby lay judges have
the ability to easily approach the courts for assistance if third
parties over-zealously pursue information and ignore lay judge
objections. In extreme cases, a court could employ contempt of
court measures, restraining orders, or some other form of
injunctive relief against insistent third parties.
Despite the various reasons supporting a complete
retraction of the lifetime post-trial confidentiality requirements
imposed on citizen judges, Japanese policymakers may feel more
comfortable with more conservative amendments. At a
minimum, however, Japan needs to incorporate a provision into
the Lay Judge Act that enables citizen judges to report suspected
abuses and seek psychological treatment without fear of reprisal.
Japan also must show more respect to citizen judges by repealing
the six-month imprisonment penalty facing citizen judges for
unauthorized disclosures.
Although less than ideal, there are other alternatives that
would do a better job of recognizing individual rights, furthering
the objectives of the lay judge system, and supporting the public
welfare than the current confidentiality scheme. For example,
Japan might explore the concept of holding supervised post-trial
interviews of willing lay judges, allowing open discussion after a
certain "cooling-off period," or permitting individuals or
organizations to petition for permission to pool citizen judges
about their experiences for research purposes. Additionally, posttrial voluntary disclosure by citizen judges might be restricted to
instances in which there is no exchange of financial
consideration or other tangible benefit associated with or
attached to the disclosure.
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More Access: The Need to Open the Doors to the Interrogation
Process inJapan

Recent events highlight the problems associated with
376
involuntary confessions and lack of access to interrogations.
These events and others call Japan's interrogation tactics and
abuse prevention mechanisms into serious question. To stop the
flow of further involuntary confession cases in Japan, the
interrogation room must be opened to greater scrutiny. The
lengthy imprisonment of Sugaya, an innocent man, based on a
coerced confession was tragic. Equally unfortunate is the reality
that Mami Matsuda's murderer remains free nearly two decades
after her heinous murder. Coerced confessions are a reality in
Japan, 377 and the discovery of cases involving involuntary
confessions continues to grow.
1.

Confessions as a Source of Controversy and the Need to
Refine the Interrogation Process

Confessions are a recurring source of controversy in Japan.
Due to the injustices and dangers associated with convicting an
innocent person and wrongfully depriving even one person of
their right to freedom, a criminal justice system must be adept at
identifying confessions susceptible to coercion and preserving
due process rights. An interrogator needs to carefully proceed
when soliciting a confession. Forced or involuntary confessions
are unacceptable. Such confessions "carry the unacceptable risk
78
of unreliability" and increase the chances of injustice.
Domestic and international critics have accused Japanese
police and prosecutors of conducting "hostage trials" in which
suspects are held in detention until they confess, regardless of
whether they committed the crime 3 7 9 Even the United Nations
has criticized the Japanese criminal justice system, observing that
Japan relies too heavily on confessions obtained during extended
376. See supranotes 67-97.
377. See generally Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REV. LAW &

Soc. SCI. 193 (2008) (explaining the types and processes responsible for false
confessions).
378. See Int'l Bar Ass'n, supra note 104, at 5-6.
379. See Stuart Biggs, Japan's Bar Demands Taped Interrogationsto Prevent Injustice,

BLOOMBERG,
June
17,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601101&sid=ad0BE0gZ0brnM (quoting Makoto Miyazaki, President of the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations).
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interrogations and unjustifiably maintains a presumption of guilt
against criminal suspects. 380 Unfortunately, Sugaya's case is only
the most recent example involving a coerced confession, and it is
expected that cases will continue to emerge unless corrective
38 1
measures are taken.
Although some observers have subjectively estimated that
ten to fifty percent of confessions may be involuntary, 382 many
observers of the Japanese criminal system will probably agree that
most confessions are accurate. 383 Illegal or improper
interrogation tactics are likely not the norm in Japan. Japanese
police, prosecutors, and governmental officials seeking to
preserve safety and punish genuine offenders deserve due
respect. Nevertheless, there is genuine concern that coerced
confessions like those solicited from Sugaya may be more than
isolated events based on recent events in Japan. 384 In any event,
convictions of the innocent based on involuntary confessions
cannot be tolerated.
a. Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Must Be Deterred
To avoid weakening the judicial system's credibility or
convicting the innocent, inappropriate tactics must be avoided
when questioning or interrogating suspects and defendants.

380. See Comm. Against Torture, Summary Record of the 767th Meeting,
18, U.N.
Doc CAT/C/SR/767 (May 9, 2007).
381. Due to the high number of actual or suspected coerced confessions in Japan,
a quarterly magazine called the Enzai File (the Falsely Accused File) started publications
on February 1, 2008. See Masami Ito, New Magazine Takes Aim at Wrongful Convictions,
JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080201f2.html.
The founder of this new magazine maintains that recent coerced confessions that have
surfaced are only the tip of the iceberg. Id.; see also Keiji Hirano, Sayama Case Taken to
UN Panel, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
nn20081031fl.html.
382. See Ramlogan, supra note 131, at 200; Interview by Matthew Wilson with
several experienced criminal defense lawyers, in Japan (June 2009) (the names of
attorneys are kept anonymous in order to prevent any impact on their professional
dealings).
383. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS 2 (2004). See generally FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 412 (4th ed.,Jones & Bartlett Pub. 2004) (2001) (observing that most
criminal confessions outside ofJapan tend to be accurate as well.)
384. See Ramlogan, supra note 131, at 200-201.
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Japan's Constitution sets out the basic limits that govern
385
interrogations.
In strictly interpreting article 38, Japanese investigators must
adapt their questioning techniques and present evidence that
corroborates all confessions. 386 In reality, interrogation
techniques have been questionable and the Japanese courts have
often required little corroborative evidence. 387 Observers note
that Japanese courts often presume guilt, until the accused can
prove his or her innocence.3 88 By loosely applying article 38 and
discounting the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the
risk of injustice and wrongful convictions increases considerably.
This is one of the primary reasons why Sugaya and other recent
wrongful conviction cases have again called the judicial decisions
and interrogatory tactics ofJapanese investigators into question.
b. The Quasi-Jury Tribunal Requires More Access to
Interrogations
In various quarters, genuine hope exists that the new lay
judge system will cultivate greater transparency. By increasing
access to the governmental interrogation of suspects and
defendants, Japan can achieve greater transparency while
simultaneously ensuring the conviction of guilty criminals and
reducing the chance of extreme injustice for the innocently
accused.
Lay judge involvement in seeking the truth about charges of
contested interrogations and involuntary confessions will both
enable increased scrutiny and provide a new perspective. One
may question whether the new lay judge system would have made
any difference in the Sugaya case. Looking two decades into the
distant past, the answer is speculative at best. However, citizen
judges would most certainly provide varying viewpoints and a
fresh perspective. They would also be less likely to presume guilt,
and more likely to have closely scrutinized his allegations of a

385. See supra notes 108-10 (highlighting fundamental bounds within which
confessions must take place).
386. Ramlogan, supra note 131, at 200; Soldwedel, supra note 19, at 1434.
387. See Onishi, supra note 87.
388. See supranotes 146-47.
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coerced confession. Professor Satoru Shinomiya 389 postulates that
the verdict may have differed because citizen judges would have
actually listened to Sugaya's involuntary confession and
spoliation of evidence claims. 390 The recent words of former
Judge Norimichi Kumamoto confirm the same. Kumamoto notes
that the media and social pressures have unduly influenced
judges in the past, and that the Japanese believe that the
prosecutor's office and government would never do anything
intentionally wrong.3 9 1 As such, the courts give minimal credence
to a defendant's claims about a coerced confession.
Additionally, empirical research over the past several
decades about the psychology of police interrogation and
likelihood of false confessions has revealed a better
understanding of the causes and consequences of involuntary
confessions. 392 For any fact-finder, it may be difficult to
comprehend the reason for an innocent person to confess to a
crime. Within the context of the new lay judge system, this may
be particularly difficult for an inexperienced citizen judge. An
innocent person in detention may rationalize that a false
admission is the quickest, or only, way out of a difficult situation.
Such rationalization may occur due to a combination of
overzealous interrogation techniques, lengthy questioning
sessions, police deception, threats, or manipulative promises.
With an eye towards justice and due process rights, every
nation should ideally scrutinize and revise its criminal justice
389. Satoru Shinomiya is a renowned attorney and law professor in Japan. He is
currently a law professor at Kokugakuin University Law School, and served as a member
of the Judicial Reform Council responsible for recommending the revolutionary change.
Kokugakuin University, Kyouin Shousai, Shinomiya Satoru [Faculty Biography: Satoru
Shinomiya], http://www.kokugakuin.ac.jp/lawschool/houka02_00097.html.
Professor
Shinomiya has played an integral role in preparations for Lay judge System in Japan,
including serving on various JFBA committees such as the Trial Advocacy Project Team
designed to train Japanese defense attorneys in the art and skill of trial advocacy.
390. See Kunio Hamada, Makoto Miyazaki & Satoru Shinomiya, Speech at The
Foreign Correspondents Club: The New Jury System, in Tokyo, Japan (June 16, 2009);
see also Kamiya, supra note 358.
391. See Wallace, supra note 354 (Judge Kumamoto questioning prosecutor tactics
in Hakamada murder case).
392. See Richard A. Leo & Kimberly D. Richman, Mandate the ElectronicRecording of
Police Interrogations,6 CRIME & POL'Y 791 (2007); see also Walter F. Bugden, Jr. & Tara L.
Isaacon, Crimes, Truth and Videotape: Mandatory Recording of Interrogations at the Police
Station, UTAH BARJ., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 28; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and MiscarriagesofJustice in the Age
of PsychologicalInterrogation,88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
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system where necessary. Japan is no exception, particularly where
innocent citizens are being sent to prison. In issuing its
recommendations, the JSRC advocated consideration of reforms
to the custodial and questioning process of suspects and
defendants. 393 Due to confirmed and alleged problems associated
with past and present interrogation procedures and involuntary
confessions, Japan needs to revisit its interrogation process.
2. Necessary Changes to the LayJudge System: Electronic
Recording of Interrogations and Presence of Defense Counsel
Prior to the judical reforms in Japan, handwritten
3 94
interrogation records by investigators were commonplace.
One-sided written records constitute inadequate recordkeeping,
and therefore can give rise to unreliable fact finding. 395 Also,
such records weaken the concept of transparency and magnify
the possibility of abuse. Given the growing number of confirmed
wrongful convictions, Japan should employ reform measures
without delay. By opening the doors on the interrogation process
to public scrutiny, most wrongful convictions derived from
396
involuntary confessions could be prevented.
In assessing the validity of a contested confession,
inexperienced lay judges and the criminal tribunal as a whole
would further benefit from the adoption of two additional tools.
First, the comprehensive electronic recording of the entire
interrogation process would significantly aid a tribunal's inquiry
about improper interrogation tactics. If officials had supplied
electronic recordings of Sugaya's interrogation to the tribunal,
the fact finder would have had an uninhibited view of the
circumstances, thereby reducing the likelihood of a wrongful
conviction.3 9 7 Citizen access to electronic recordings of the entire
questioning process would decrease the possibility of involuntary
confessions. Instead of facing conflicting stories about unseen
393. SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 2527, ch. II, pts. 2, 4(2).
394. See supra note 122.
395. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 792.
396. See id.
397. See Nakamura et al., supra note 82 (quoting Tatsuya Kawasaki, Vice-President
of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, who stated "if sound and video recording of
the whole investigation process had been introduced at that time, the false charges
could have been avoided"); see also Kamiya, supra note 358 (quoting Makoto Miyazaki,
President of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations).
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conduct in the interrogation room, electronic recording provides
an unrestricted view of interrogative techniques and the
defendant's answers. Electronic recording open to scrutiny also
serves as a check on improper questioning techniques. Second,
another possible tool to aid lay judges and criminal tribunals in
their assessment of claims of involuntary confessions is the
presence of counsel during interrogations. The presence of
counsel would provide the tribunal with another resource. It
would also constitute an important check on questioning
practices and techniques. By making these additional tools
available, all participants in the lay judge system stand to benefit.
In principle, Japan needs to implement specific legislation
that (1) requires electronic recording of criminal interrogations
in their entirety, and (2) allows defense counsel to attend the
interrogations. These reforms are consistent with the mission of
the Japanese criminal justice system, which strives to obtain the
"truth of the cases under the guarantee of due process of law." 398
These reforms are simple, inexpensive, and benefit all parties
involved in the criminal justice system. They also promote
accurate fact finding by the mixed quasi-jury tribunal and
3 99
facilitate the conviction of guilty defendants.
a. Electronic Recording of Criminal Interrogations
Requiring the comprehensive electronic recording of all
interrogations will aid the lay judge system and facilitate justice.
At present, Japanese law does not mandate the recording of
interrogations, and investigators do not electronically record
interrogations in full. 40 0 In assessing the criminal justice system,
the JSRC submitted that "a system should be introduced that
imposes the duty of making a written record for every occasion of
questioning." 401 Although the JSRC acknowledged arguments in
favor of electronic recording as well as the attendance of defense
counsel during the interrogation process, they reserved making
any recommendation and encouraged future consideration of
4°2
these matters.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. II, pts. 2, 4(2).
See id.
See Biggs, supra note 379.
SeeJUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. II, pts. 2, 4(2)b.
Id.
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Since theJSRC recommendations were issued in 2001, there
have been increasing calls for more access to the interrogation
room.4 0 3 The JFBA, interest groups, political parties, and even the
United Nations have exerted pressure on the Japanese
40 4
government to electronically record interrogations in full.
Notwithstanding, the Japanese government has opposed this
idea. The National Police Agency, Japanese prosecutors, the
Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court of Japan, and Cabinet
ministers have objected to the full and comprehensive recording
of the interrogation of suspects. 4 5 The Diet has refused to
mandate full electronic recording as well. 40 6 The government's
willingness to record has been limited to the confession portion
of the interrogation. 4 7 Limited electronic recording does not
capture the entire interrogative process, and has been primarily
408
intended to serve the prosecutors' own purposes.
In light of the inclusion of citizen judges into the
deliberative process, Japan should require the submission of
unedited and complete electronic recordings of interrogations as
a precondition of introducing confession evidence at trial. Now
that the lay judge system is operative, the mixed-tribunal needs to
403. See, e.g., Biggs, supra note 379; Press Release, Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, UN
Torture Committee: Japan's Substitute Prison System Must be Reconsidered
Immediately Following the Committee's Recommendations, Says Japan Federation of
Bar Associations (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/
en/activities/meetings/070530.html; see also Keiji Hirano, Full Recording of Interrogations
is Key to Fairness, KYODO NEWS (Japan), May 27, 2009, http://home.kyodo.co.jp/

modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=441176.
404. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, supra note 105; Press Release,Japan Fed'n of
Bar Ass'ns, supra note 403; Kamiya, supra note 88; Mori Cool to Taped Grillings,JAPAN

TIMES,June 6, 2009, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090606a2.html.
405. See, e.g., Mori Cool to Taped Grillings, supra note 404 (State Minister and

chairman of the National Public Safety Commission); see also Kamiya, supra note 88
(Prosecutor's Office and National Police Agency); Upper House Passes Bill to Fully Record,

Film Interrogations, KYODO NEWS (Japan), Apr. 24, 2009, available at 4/24/09 JWIRE
02:35:08 (Westlaw) (Minister of Justice, Eisuke Mori); Bruce Wallace, Court Case May
Shine Light on Japan's Interrogations,L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2007, at A1O (prosecutors and
police, generally).
406. See Kamiya, supra note 88; Editorial, Reform for the Citizens, ASAHI SHIMBUN
(Japan), Jan. 30, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 21854909.
407. See Biggs, supra note 379; see also Killer's Video Confession Rejected as Not Credible,

TIMES, July 9, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080709b7.html
(rejecting limited twenty-five minute video recording of the defendant's confession. The
presiding judge stated that the limited footage does not support the credibility of the
remarks).
408. See Biggs, supranote 379.
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have a transparent view and clear understanding of how each
confession was obtained. Electronic recording will enable a more
accurate and exact determination of whether a confession was
coerced. Recording technology will help facilitate discovery of
the truth, and enable the government to obtain the strongest
evidence possible to assist in convicting the guilty. 4° 9
The Japanese criminal justice system will realize significant
benefits if Japan adopts legislation mandating the electronic
recording of all questioning of any suspect, detainee, or
defendant allegedly involved in a crime. There are many benefits
to utilizing recording technology on either an overt or covert
basis. Technology is not an impediment to these benefits. As a
world leader, Japan has the technological means and ability to
electronically record all interrogations. Technology costs are
minimal,4 10 particularly in comparison to the expense associated
with adjudicating extended disputes as well as the unquantifiable
costs associated with involuntary confessions. Additionally, the
concerns cited by opponents and the Japanese government are
largely unfounded or capable of resolution.
i.

Recording Reduces Conflict and Saves Judicial Resources

Mandatory recording of interrogations will reduce potential
conflict between the government and defense, thereby saving
precious time and judicial resources for the mixed judge
tribunal. In Japanese criminal trials, the defense commonly
argues that investigators coerced the defendant's confession
through leading questions, forceful interrogations, and illicit
tactics. 41 1 Claims of involuntary confession provoke contentious
debate between the prosecution and defense. A defendant may
attack a prior confession by demonstrating that interrogations
used inappropriate tactics, a crime never occurred, the confessor
could not have committed the crime, or the confessor did not
412
commit the crime.
409.

See THE JUSTICE

PROJECT,

ELECTRONIC

RECORDING

OF

CUSTODIAL

INTERROGATIONS:
A
POLICY
REVIEW
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack-recording-fin2.pdf.
410. See Leo & Richman, supranote 392.
411. See Kamiya, supra note 88; Reform for the Citizens, supra note 406.
412. See, e.g., Taisuke Kanayama, Transparencyof CriminalInvestigations in the United
States and Japan 6-7 (USJP Occasional Paper 06-06, 2006),
available at
http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/us-japan/research/pdf/06-06.kanayama.pdf.
For
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Access to unadulterated footage of questioning will
eliminate the need to rely on one-sided written records designed
to detail the results of specific interrogations, and should also
reduce the number of disputes about alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in general. 413 The camera will capture a suspect's
words, actions, and attitudes. As such, the record will speak for
itself so nothing will be left to the imagination. This will make it
much easier for citizen judges, district court judges, and even
appellate court judges to assess the interrogation and confession
process. 414 Also, to the extent that recording reduces the number
of disputes over confessions, the time necessary for citizen service
can be minimized.
Debate about inappropriate interrogations can significantly
prolong a trial as the fact-finder must explore the veracity of the
defendant's assertions and credibility of the investigators'
responses. 4 15 The debate not only affects the trial in the first
4 16
instance, but it can also extend to subsequent appellate review.
By granting unabated access to the interrogation room through
electronic recording, the debate between the parties can be
streamlined. 417 The frequency of related appeals should be less
likely as well. This streamlining measure is consistent with the
4 18
overall goal of mitigating the burdens placed on citizen judges,
and should be adopted to help prevent trials from being
unnecessarily prolonged due to disputes over the credibility of
confessions.
At present, Japan's interrogation rooms are particularly
secretive and closed. 419 This exacerbates any dispute about a
confession's validity. By opening interrogations to scrutiny and
example, in Mr. Sugaya's case, scientific evidence affirmatively established his
innocence. Of note, ongoing research in the United States shows that fifteen to twenty
percent of DNA exoneration cases involved false confessions. Kassin, supranote 150.
413. See SULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 24.
414. See id. at 13-14.
415. See Reform for the Citizens, supra note 406.
416. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 793-94; see alsoYasuda, supra note 116
(noting that it is very time-consuming to determine whether the confession was honest
or coerced, when the defendant challenges the credibility of his own confession).
417. See Reform for the Citizens, supranote 407.
418. See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 25, ch. IV, pt. 1(1)
(advocating that the government should give due consideration to mitigating the
burdens of the system on the public).
419. See Press Release, Japan Fed'n of Bar Ass'ns, supra note 403; Biggs, supra note
379; Hirano, supra note 403.
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making the process more transparent, the risk of controversy and
time necessary to resolve disputes related to confessions should
be diminished considerably. Although a suspect's dishonesty
might explain contradictory accounts of a retracted confession,
handwritten reports of interrogations can be attacked on the
grounds of faulty recording, equivocal interpretations, disparate
perceptions, preconceived notions, misunderstandings, and
imprecision. 420 Without full electronic recordings, the waters are
unnecessarily muddied and the fact-finder's ability to clear up
the vagaries associated a particular interrogation is hindered.
To date, Japanese judges have been forced to imagine
investigations behind closed doors to determine which side has
the most credibility. 421 Going forward, inexperienced citizen
judges will face claims of involuntary confessions. By adopting
mandatory and complete
electronic recording
of all
interrogations, the process will become more transparent. Not
only will all members of the tribunal be able to observe first-hand
the important interplay that occurs between the investigators and
suspects during the interrogation process, but they also will be
able to make thorough and more accurate determinations
related to the confessions. Again, this should reduce the judicial
time and effort necessary to resolve controversies related to
confessions. It should further ensure the rights of the accused,
and facilitate the conviction of actual perpetrators. As such,
Japan should quickly implement legislation making the
electronic recording of the interrogation process mandatory.
ii.

Opening the Doors to the Interrogation Room Has Public
Support

The Japanese public supports electronic recording of the
entire interrogation process. Over the past several years, public
calls for Japan to open the doors and make the interrogation
process transparent have increased. With the recent
implementation of the lay judge system, these calls have
intensified even more. In May 2009, the Japan Federation of Bar
420. See Brian Parsi Boetig et. al, Revealing Incommunicado: Electronic Recording of
Police Interrogations,FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2006, at 1.
421. In light of the abnormally high conviction rate, it is evident that professional
judges are very likely to side with their prosecutor colleagues when doubt arises
concerning what transpires behind closed doors.
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Associations presented twenty-nine cardboard boxes filled with
petitions signed by over 1.1 million Japanese citizens to the
Japanese Diet.422 These petitions called for legislation requiring
investigative authorities to fully videotape criminal suspect
questioning, as opposed to simply recording the confession
423
itself.
There have also been multiple, albeit unsuccessful, attempts
in the Diet recently to pass legislation to this effect. In December
2007, the Democratic Party ofJapan ("DPJ") submitted a bill that
would have required investigative authorities to fully record and
film interrogations of criminal suspects. 42 4 Majority opposition in
425
the more powerful House of Representatives killed the bill.
The DPJ did not give up, though. Again, in April 2009, the DPJ
attempted to enact similar legislation in advance of the lay judge
system's implementation. Although the DPJ-controlled House of
Councillors passed the measure, 426 it was unable to muster
sufficient support in the House of Representatives for passage.
With the parliamentary elections on August 30, 2009, resulting in
an outright majority for the DPJ in both houses of the Diet,427 the
DPJ now has the ability to pass legislation mandating electronic
recording. Going forward, it is expected that the DPJ will pass
428
legislation requiring the recording of interrogation sessions.
Japan would benefit most from legislation that mandates
comprehensive recording of the interrogations of all criminal
suspects and defendants.

422. See Citizen Judge System, supra note 205. Japan's population is estimated at
about 127 million people. Id.
423. See 1 Million Signatures Seek Mandatory Videotaping of Police Questioning, KYODO
NEWS (Japan), May 14, 2009, available at 5/14/09JWIRE 07:57:08 (Westlaw).
424. See Upper House Passes Bill to Fully Record, Film Interrogations,supra note 405.
425. See id. (noting that the House of Representatives was controlled by the
majority coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") and the New Komeito Party
at the time, both of which oppose opening the doors to the interrogation room)
426. See id.
427. See DPJ Preparesfor Government; Top Brass Discusses Cabinet Makeup; Hatoyama
Woos SDP, PNP,DAILYYOMIURI (Japan), Sept. 1, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 16994513.
428. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN'S
PLATFORM FOR GOVERNMENT 27 (2009), available at http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/
manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf.

556

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:487

iii. Electronic Recording Removes the Presumption of Guilt
Electronic recording will equip mixed tribunals with the
tools necessary to seriously scrutinize any confession in doubt. In
Japan, professional judges have been in the "habit of handing
down guilty verdicts," and media reports painting the accused as
guilty even before the commencement of trial have "pressured
judges to find [defendants] guilty." 429 In essence, criminal
proceedings have merely become a formality. 430 With access to an
unabridged
and complete
electronic
recording, both
professional and citizen judges will not only be able to determine
whether a confession is voluntary, but can also obtain other
useful information relevant to the trial. When a fact-finder can
access unadulterated electronic recordings, the likelihood of
correct and just verdicts can only increase.
iv. Electronic Recording Enhances Professionalism
Electronic recording will renew focus on professional
responsibility in the interrogation process, and reduce the risk
that the tribunal will ratify false confessions. If governmental
officials record interrogations in their entirety, interrogators will
interview suspects in a professional manner. Interrogators are
less likely to use questionable
techniques,
including
psychologically coercive tactics, if they know that there will be a
record of their interrogation reviewable by professional and
citizen judges at trial. 431 The quality of the interrogations will
increase, and investigative work in Japan may regain its
credibility. 432 Moreover, the increased visibility in the
interrogation room will reduce the likelihood of involuntary
confessions, safeguard the rights of suspects and defendants, as
well as enhance public confidence in law enforcement and the
justice system as a whole.

429. See Kenji Hirano, Ex-Judge Now Doubts Convictions' Credibility,JAPAN TIMES, Mar.

12, 2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040312b6.html; see also Wallace,
supra note 405.
430. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 185-86.
431. See SULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 16.
432. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 795.
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All Parties Will Benefit from a Complete and Accurate
Record

All stakeholders in the criminal justice process can benefit
from mandatory recording. First, the government will realize
benefits from the unedited electronic recording of suspect
interviews. 433 With a permanent and complete record of the
interrogations, prosecutors can put forward the most accurate
case possible. 434 Electronic recording will help Japanese
prosecutors "secure convictions of those who are actually guilty,
435
avoiding additional victimization and threats to public safety."
Actual perpetrators clogging up the courts with unfounded
claims of coercion will be discouraged from pursuing such
claims. In addition, prosecutors can use the permanent
questioning record to prepare for trial. Because prosecutors can
go back and review the electronic recording, they can focus on
responses rendered during questioning, as opposed to
concentrating on note taking during the interrogations. 436
Prosecutors can also more accurately refresh their recollection of
the questions asked and answers rendered well after the
conclusion of interrogations.
With
the
introduction
of
electronic
recording,
governmental officials will gain a valuable tool for investigating
and studying the causes of involuntary confessions, 437 and can use
the recordings for training purposes and for the development
and institution of further safeguards against questionable
438
interrogation techniques.
Defense counsel will benefit as well. They can use the
electronic recordings to assess the case and prepare for trial.
With access to the interrogation room, defense counsel would
have access to information unlike ever before. This would help
streamline the proceedings as defense counsel could obtain
valuable information to better prepare for trial, narrow down the
issues in dispute, and make an accurate assessment of whether to
challenge an allegedly coerced confession. Because defense
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

See SULLIVAN, supranote 383, at 6; Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 793-95.
See SULLIVAN, supranote 383, at 6.
Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 796.
SULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 10; Leo & Richman, supranote 392, at 795.
See Leo & Richman, supranote 392 at 796.
SeeJSULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 18; Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 795.
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attorneys have been kept out of the interrogation room to date,
they have been left only to speculate as to the accuracy of
renditions about what transpired behind closed doors. This has
hindered preparations and assessments. 439 With the introduction
of the lay judge system and trial hearings held on consecutive
days, it is even more important that defense counsel be afforded
the tools and information necessary to prepare for trial.
Most importantly, electronic recording will help ensure that
interrogators do not mistreat suspects or defendants and that
they do not use tactics likely to elicit involuntary confessions.
Absent the use of audio or video recording, the danger of
involuntary confessions looms large. 440 Appropriate questioning
techniques should be used with all suspects. Also, particular care
should be given to the questioning of mentally challenged or
intellectually deficient suspects. Electronic recording would
provide an additional level of protection against manipulation
and coercion for challenged suspects and others.
vi. Partial Recording Is Inadequate and Potentially Misleading
Partial recording of the interrogation process is inadequate
for purposes of the quasijury tribunal and the accused.
Recording a suspect's final confession, but not the preceding
interrogation, is far inferior to acquiring a complete record of
the questioning. 441 To eliminate the uncertainties related to
confessions, professional and citizen judges should have the
ability to consider: (1) the conditions under which a suspect
confessed; (2) the degree to which interrogators used pressuring
techniques; and (3) whether the confession contains details that
have been independently verified in relation to the crime at
issue. 442 A confession can only prove guilt beyond a reasonable

439. See Hirano, supra note 403.
440. See id. Hiroshi Yanagihara was detained in 2002 in connection with several
rape cases. Id. Intimidated by prosecutors and their refusal to allow him to say no or not
true, Yanagihara involuntarily confessed to something that he neither did nor even knew
anything about. Id. He was convicted and his attorney discouraged him from appealing.
Id. Yanagihara was detained for 1005 days before he was released. Id. In 2007, the police
caught the real culprit. Id. Yanagihara firmly believes that he would not have been
convicted or coerced to confess if video or audio recordings were used during the
interrogation process. Id.
441. See SULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 17.
442. See Kassin, supra note 150.
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doubt if it consists of information known only to the suspect. 443 It
cannot consist of information solely derivable from the media,
photographs, leading questions, or other secondary sources that
are hidden from the view of the fact-finder. 444
To identify a false confession, a fact-finder naturally tends to
look at the confession in isolation. However, for both legal and
psychological reasons, a fact-finder must not separate a
confession from the interrogation used to garner it. 445 Electronic
recording of all aspects of the interrogation process provide a
fact-finder with access to both the confession and interrogation,
enabling an evaluation of the entire process. Interrogation
tactics, allegedly used to coerce confessions, warrant scrutiny.
The practice of lying to suspects and presenting false evidence
during interrogation increases the risk that an innocent person,
particularly someone vulnerable to manipulation, will confess to
acts they did not commit. 446 These practices can cause suspects to
internalize blame for acts committed by others.447 Accordingly,
the tribunal should have the opportunity to observe these tactics
with a realization that deception increases the possibility of false
confessions.
If the Japanese government continues to rely on selective
taping, the problems associated with involuntary confessions and
claims thereof will persist. These problems include lingering
charges of improper prosecutorial conduct, negative inferences
drawn against the government based on its refusal to acquiesce to
comprehensive taping, and forfeited educational opportunities
for all courtroom actors. In addition, the absence of electronic
recording may result in the misstatement or omission of
important evidence. 448 Accordingly, the tribunal needs to have
access to unadulterated footage of interrogations to the extent
that a confession is going to be introduced at trial.

443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

See supra note 110.
See Kassin, supranote 150.
See INBAU ET AL., supra note 383, at 412.
See Kassin, supranote 150.
See id.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 383 at 17-18.
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vii. Opposition by Current Governmental Officials Is Unfounded
or Concerns Can Be Resolved
Mandatory electronic recording of the entire interrogation
process is intended to facilitate the accurate collection and
preservation of confession evidence in the most unbiased and
efficient manner possible. 449 Unless there is something to hide,
investigators and prosecutors have no credible basis to withhold
the substance of interrogations as recordings stand to benefit
investigators and prosecutors. Even so, Japanese police,
prosecutors, and the government still do not support the concept
of recording the entire interrogation process. The recent
emergence of involuntary confession cases has not changed the
standard policy or practice.
The government argues that comprehensive recording will
diminish the willingness of suspects to cooperate with
investigators, and that suspects will not respond to questioning if
investigators record their statements. 450 Eisuke Mori, former
Minister ofJustice, explains that the full recording of questioning
and interrogation of suspects "would make questioning
harder." 451 According to governmental officials, interrogators
need to develop a relationship of trust to elicit confessions, and
recording will make it difficult, if not impossible, to develop such
a relationship. 452 Because recording will impede the ability to
acquire the truth and reduce the chance of suspect cooperation,
the government contends that comprehensive recording would
453
be detrimental.
The Japanese government is not totally opposed to all
electronic recording of interrogations, however. In anticipation
of lay judge involvement in the criminal justice process, the
government decided that recording the confession portion of the
interrogation process would give credibility to the interrogation
process. 454 Accordingly, prosecutors started to partially record
interrogations in July 2006, and police started recording in

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See Boetig et al., supranote 420.
See Nakamura et al., supra note 82.
Upper House PassesBill to Fully Record, Film Interrogations,supra note 405.
SeeYasuda, supra note 116.
See Nakamura et al., supra note 82.
See Upper House Passes Bill to Fully Record, Film Interrogations,supra note 405.
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September 2008 on an "experimental" basis. 45 5 In conjunction
with the lay judge system, governmental officials are creating
DVD recordings of suspect interrogations. 4 6 To demonstrate that
a confession was voluntary, the DVD recordings show suspects
checking the content of their written confessions, signing the
confessions, and explaining the background underlying their
confessions. 457 This practice recognizes the reality that citizen
judges will demand stricter and more accurate proofs with
respect to the credibility of interrogation records and
45 8
confessions.
Contrary to the concerns voiced by the government, past
experience outside of Japan indicates that electronic recording
does not cause suspects to shy away from talking or openly
responding to questions. 459 Research demonstrates that even
when suspects are cognizant of overt recording, they generally
shift their attention to the questioning and provide complete
responses. 460 It also shows that electronic recording allows
prosecutors to obtain favorable information and useful materials
during the taped interrogations. 461
To the extent that overt recording might hinder the
questioning of a particular suspect, then Japan has the ability to
employ other tools to assist the tribunal. For instance, the
presence of defense counsel in the interrogation room would
provide a useful check on interrogation techniques. Covert
recording of interrogations could also alleviate any chilling effect
on the suspect. In a worst case scenario, if the cooperation of a
suspect is impossible, then the interrogator might stop the
recording and proceed to take handwritten notes in the
traditional sense. 462 In such cases, however, Japan would need to
establish a standard whereby prosecutors are required to prove

455. See Katakawa, supra note 319.
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. See Upper House Passes Bill to Fully Record, Film Interrogations,supranote 405.

459. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 792-93 (citing various studies that
specifically refute the unsupported assertion that recording inhibits questions and
incriminating statements); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 383, at 19-22.
460. See SULLIVAN, supranote 383, at 20.

461. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 793.
462. See id.
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that recording was not feasible under the circumstances. 463 These
tools would avert systemic abuses and help preserve justice.
Finally, as prosecutors continue to express concerns about
the availability of interrogative techniques, Japan might consider
reforms that provide prosecutors with the authority to pleabargain, offer testimonial immunity, or conduct undercover
stings. If Japanese prosecutors generally limit their prosecution
to suspects or defendants who confess, it follows that prosecutors
are setting guilty perpetrators free. This demonstrates a systemic
flaw that policymakers might address by increasing the tools
available to prosecutors, while simultaneously mandating the
electronic recording of interrogations. Such reforms would
empower prosecutors to spend more time focusing on corporate
464
crime, crimes of corruption, and organized crime.
By opposing growing demands to electronically record the
entire interrogation process, the government's motives are
questionable. The police and prosecutors may not want to allow
the judges, the media, or the general public to see how
unprofessional or inappropriate their typical interrogation tactics
can be. Alternatively, if a tribunal does not have access to the
"real data" or the words and actions actually leading up to a
confession, the government can control the spin and cloud the
465
tribunal's ability to determine whether errors have been made.
In either case, greater transparency will remove doubts about the
government's intentions and actions.
viii. Other Countries Have Seen Success with Full Electronic
Recording
Many countries record the interrogation process using
audio, video, or other digital technology with much success. The
list of countries includes, among others, Australia, France,
Germany, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. 466 In contrast, Japan stands alone in its
463. See id. at 794.
464. See FOOTE, supra note 149, at 349 (discussing the current system's struggles
with adequately controlling these areas).
465. See Dennis Wagner, FBI's Policy Drawing Fire; InterrogationsNot Taped, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Dec. 6, 2005, at IA.
466. See David T. Johnson, You Don't Need a Weather Man to Know Which Way the
Wind Blows: Lessons from the United States and South Korea for Recording Interrogations in
Japan,24 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 141, 142 (2008).
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resistance to engage in complete, unedited electronic
467
recording.
In these countries, electronic recording has proven to be an
effective tool in documenting crime scenes, traffic stops,
accidents, and conducting undercover surveillance and other
monitoring operations. 468 Electronic recording also has been
effective in the investigative process. In fact, a survey of over 450
law enforcement agencies in the United States demonstrated that
the electronic recording of custodial interviews of felony suspects
469
has been "uniformly positive."
Many U.S. jurisdictions permit covert recording, thereby
alleviating any concerns about recorded questioning. 470 Even
when overt recording has been conducted, however, the reaction
has been positive. 4 71 Research has shown no conclusive evidence
that a suspect's reluctance to cooperate and confess increases
when authorities conduct overt recording. 472 Consequently,
electronic recording continues to gain popularity in the United
States with both the prosecution and defense. 473 At present,
Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Washington, and the
District of Columbia, have adopted statutes that require
electronic recording of entire interrogations in at least some, if
not all, types of criminal cases. 474 Also, the supreme courts of
Alaska, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New
Jersey have ordered police to record suspect interrogations in
475
certain circumstances.
Other U.S. states and localities also voluntarily engage in the
electronic recording of interrogations, and general support for
electronic recording exists in other sectors as well. For example,
in 2004, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution
467. Id.
468. Boetig et al., supra note 420.
469. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 409; SULLvAN, supra note 383, at 1-28
(asserting that the Sullivan study is not an exhaustive study of all U.S. prosecutors and
police departments, and that there are many more governmental arms that engage in
recording either on a mandatory or voluntary basis).
470. See Boetig et al., supra note 420.
471. See id.
472. See id.
473. SeeJohnson, supra note 466, at 144.
474. See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 792; see a/soJohnson, supranote 466, at
144; Wagner, supra note 465.
475. See Wagner, supranote 465.
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urging law enforcement organizations to implement electronic
recording of interrogations. 476 U.S. calls for increased recording
have been targeted at: (1) reducing the possibility of false
confessions and abusive police interrogation practices; (2)
making it easier for fact-finders to determine the voluntariness
and trustworthiness of confession
evidence;
and
(3)
477
strengthening the relationship between police and community.
Over the past several decades, the number of law enforcement
agencies utilizing electronic recording of the interrogation
process has increased significantly. 478 This trend is expected to
continue as calls for mandatory, verbatim recording continue.
b. Presence of Defense Counsel During Interrogations Merits
Serious Consideration
To further reduce the likelihood of injustice, defense
lawyers should have the ability to attend the interrogations as
well. At present, Japanese police criminal investigation guidelines
specify that "an attorney or a person deemed appropriate" may
be present during suspect interrogations in certain cases. 479 In
reality, however, suspects are not afforded the opportunity to
have legal counsel present during interrogation. 480 To guard
against questionable interrogation techniques and psychological
pressures applied during pretrial detention, electronic recording
of interrogations or the presence of defense counsel is essential.
In addition, the adoption of these tools will aid the mixed
tribunals in reaching the truth.
The Japanese government opposes access to the
interrogation room on the grounds that the presence of defense
counsel may inhibit the "essential functions of interrogations" in
which investigators "build relations of trust with the suspect
through directly facing, hearing, and persuading the suspect"
and then "clarify the true facts of the case by obtaining
476. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 239

(2009).
477.
478.
pointing
recoding
479.

SeeJohnson, supra note 466, at 143.
See Leo & Richman, supra note 392, at 792 (noting growing support, but also
out that many police departments in the U.S. continue to resist the idea of
interrogations in their entirety); see alsoJohnson, supra note 466, at 15.
See Hanzai S6sa Kihan [Crime Investigation Regulations], art. 180(2) (2003);

JAPAN FED'N OF BAR AWS'NS, supranote 87, at

10.

480. JAPAN FED'N OF BAR ASW'NS, supra note 87, at 10.
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statements of truth from the suspects." 481 Further, the
government is concerned that investigating officer may refrain
from posing certain questions out of fear that investigation
methods and information sources will be revealed to defense
counsel, or that coordinating schedules with defense counsel will
482
leave insufficient time for questioning suspects.

The government's arguments are inadequate grounds for
denial of the right to counsel during interrogations, however.
Without legal representation, a suspect is left to withstand the
intense powers of government in literal isolation while facing the
prospective long-term loss of freedom, assets, or life.
Fundamentally, a suspect to should be granted access to counsel
at all times, unless such access is waived. Moreover, there is no
credible reason to deny the presence of defense counsel. To the
extent that investigators need to build a relationship of trust with
a suspect, they can do so in the presence of defense counsel.
By opening the interrogation room doors to defense
counsel, the likelihood of using questionable interrogation
methods and interview techniques will decrease. 483 In turn, this
will aid the mixed tribunal and citizen judges in making objective
to confessions. Also, increased
determinations
related
transparency will preserve the rights of the accused and conflicts
involving confessions will decline. In a recent examination of the
Japanese criminal justice system, the United Nations Committee
Against Torture expressed deep concern about the lack of
procedural guarantees available to detainees, including the
absence of defense counsel during interrogations, and even
recommended that suspects in Japan must be "guaranteed access
to the presence of defense counsel during interrogation." 484 With
the inception of the lay judge system, now is the perfect time for
Japan to take the next step and provide suspects with
unrestricted access to counsel.

481. Comm. Against Torture, supranote 105, at 6.
482. See id.
483. See Soldwedel, supra note 19, at 1434-40.
484. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee
Against Torture:Japan, 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007).
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More Time: The Need to Bifurcate Proceedingsand Focus More on
Objective Evidence and Less on Time

In deference to the citizenry, Japan has attempted to design
its new lay judge trial system in the least burdensome and timeconsuming way possible. These recent innovations have achieved
greater efficiency, however, only at the cost of the accused. As
such, further tweaking is necessary to be compatible with the
goals ofjudicial reform in Japan.
1. Bifurcate Trials Proceedings: Determine Guilt and Sentence
Separately
In the new lay judge system, professional and citizen judges
will collaborate to reach a verdict, and if necessary, concomitantly
determine the sentence of a guilty defendant. 485 Within this
quasi-jury system, the presumption of innocence and
deliberation process may be negatively impacted by recent victim
rights legislation unless the timing of victim participation during
trial is altered. The ability of victims or their families to actively
participate in the trial proceedings before the determination of
guilt or innocence potentially conflicts with the concept of
presumptive innocence and unfairly tips the scale of justice
against the accused. By restructuring the flow of criminal trials
through bifurcation, Japan can enable meaningful victim
participation at trial, while also avoiding potential prejudice to
the accused.
A crime victim should receive access to the courtroom and
information regarding the resolution of the crime at issue,
particularly within a transparent judicial system. Access is
consistent with important victim's rights. Participation in the
process may enable victims and their families to obtain closure,
or obtain an in-court apology. In a Japanese cultural context,
these elements have much significance. Prosecutors may benefit
from a victim's in-court presence as well. Not only will the
prosecutor's case appear real and sympathetic, but the victim can
possibly clarify facts or shed light on testimony, written evidence,
or other in-court statements.
At the same time, however, there are many dangers
associated with allowing victims to actively participate in the trial
485. See supranotes 200-02.

2010]

JAPAN'S NEW CRIMINALJURY TRIAL SYSTEM

567

proceedings before a verdict has been rendered, unless the
victim offers testimony directly related to the facts of the case.
With the inception of lay judge trials, it is necessary to further
explore the effect that active victim participation has on lay
judges, and also to establish proper controls that simultaneously
permit victim participation while avoiding undue prejudice to
the accused.
a. Preserving the Rights and Interests of the Accused and Crime
Victim Through Bifurcation
In the current system, victims may share feelings, opinions,
and other subjective thoughts during the one-phase trial
proceedings with court permission. 48 6 Allowing active victim
participation before the issuance of a verdict runs the risk of
unjustly influencing the mixed tribunal and unfairly tipping the
scales of justice against the accused. Such subjective
contributions do not constitute objective evidence. 48 7 A tribunal
cannot rest a conviction or sentence on "subjective whims or
prejudices," rather it must determine matters on an "objective,
rational basis." 488 The courtroom serves as a place to determine
truth based on facts and objective evidence. 489 Victim
participation as currently contemplated under the revised Code
of Criminal Procedure 490 does not advance the presentation of
objective evidence or impartial determination of facts. Rather, it
unnecessarily opens the door to additional emotion and
subjective opinions before the tribunal reaches a verdict. 49 1 The
courts must exclude possible prejudices or preconceptions
against the accused.
A neutral criminal justice system should not allow statements
of opinion, excessive emotion, and subjective elements to

486. See supranote 277 and accompanying text.
487. See KEISOHO [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 292-2; Kawaide, supra note
269, at 4.
488. See DANDO, supra note 128, at 327-28.
489. See Masami Ito, Victim Participation in Trials Risky, Experts Say, JAPAN TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070330a3.html ("The court
is [a place] to acknowledge facts based on appropriate evidence").
490. See supra notes 275-80.
491. Cf Editorial, supranote 276 (noting that emotions should not rule in criminal
trials); Ito, supra note 489 ("The criminal court should not be a place ruled by
emotion.").
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prejudice the defendant or even influence the determination of
innocence or guilt. Moreover, even express instructions from the
presiding judge to the lay judges not to consider such statements
when reaching a verdict do not mitigate the potential dangers
and possible prejudice. 492 Through the introduction of opinions,
possible vengeful statements, or even emotional questioning
from a victim into the preverdict phase of a trial, there is a real
risk that inexperienced citizen judges will discount factual
evidence and overlook the presumption of innocence against the
accused. Based on subjective materials, citizen judges may overemphasize emotion when attempting to reach a verdict in a way
that professional judges are trained to disregard.
Further, questioning by victims as part of the guilt
determination process does not facilitate the objective or rational
determination of innocence or guilt. Conversely, it may have the
opposite effect. Faced with the prospect of emotional or
inflammatory questions in front of the tribunal, a defendant
faces the prospect of extreme prejudice. Citizen judges
unfamiliar with such intense emotional questioning may be
unjustly swayed, and subsequently place less emphasis on
objective evidence or facts. 493 In addition, even if the accused is
innocent, he or she may be reluctant to frankly respond to
questions out of respect to the victim or fear that a response may
offend the victim. The tribunal may incorrectly perceive the
reluctance to respond as a sign of guilt. Further, questions posed
by the victim may contradict or even undermine the strategy or
case theory advanced by the prosecutor. In any event, trained
prosecutors can better handle questions aimed at the defendant.
If the victim wishes to pose questions during the presentencing
stage of a trial, such questions should be filtered through the
prosecutors.
To guard against the subjective distortion caused by
emotional statements and questioning, victims should not be
492. See Philip Brasor, New Law May Backfire on Victims, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fd20090208pb.htmi (noting those who oppose
the current system believe victim participation "will prejudice judges and undermine the
fundamental principal of a criminal trial, which is that the defendant is deemed
innocent until proven guilty").
493. See Reynolds, supra note 1 (citing the fear of Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, a law
professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, that victims and their families may hold too
much emotional sway over the layjudges for the new system to be successful).
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allowed to actively participate in a trial before guilt is established.
The government must show that the accused is guilty beyond
494
reasonable belief using relevant facts and objective evidence.
Naturally, active participation through direct factual testimony
would be exempted from this rule. Unless a victim can offer
objective and direct testimony as a witness regarding the alleged
crime, a victim's subjective statements and opinions should be
reserved for a separate time and place once the tribunal has
concretely determined guilt. A verdict must be objectively
reached first, before the subjective input from the crime victim
becomes relevant. For this to be possible, Japan should seriously
consider bifurcating its current one-phase trial process so that
there are two separate and distinct stages: a verdict stage, in
which the tribunal objectively determines guilt or innocence,
and, if necessary, a sentencing stage. With bifurcated trials, the
system can preserve objective proceedings and afford a
presumption of innocence to the accused until guilt has been
495
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Bifurcation need not harm victims' rights or interests in
participating in the process. Victims can participate in the guilt
phase by observing the proceedings and using the prosecutor as a
proxy to pose questions to witnesses. Also, before the sentencing
phase, prosecutors can make a concerted effort to constantly
communicate with victims and incorporate their input into the
trial proceedings. To promote victim satisfaction and impact,
Japan might also consider other ways to assimilate victim
feedback into the pretrial process, including soliciting feedback
on the charges and recommended sentences. Moreover, victims
can actively participate during the sentencing phase of trial in
the form of questioning or subjective statements of opinion.

494. See Landsman & Zhang, supra note 19, at 189.
495. Alternatively, to maximize the effectiveness of the new lay judge system and
alleviate the chance of undue prejudice to the accused, Japan could scale back recent
victims' right legislation. However, it is unnecessary to retreat to past times in which
victims had fewer rights. Japan instituted its Crime Victim Act in recognition that victims
deserve greater access to the courtroom, the judicial process requires more
transparency, and victims should have the ability to play a greater role in the trial
proceedings if they so desire. See UNHRC, supra note 123,
76-77. Before the Crime
Victim Act, victims were infrequently advised about the trial or investigation process. See
Kawaide, supra note 269, at 1. Some victims were not apprised about hearing schedules
nor invited to hearings unless they were scheduled to testify. See id.
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Victims should still have the right to observe the trial, talk
with prosecutors, and receive information related to the
prosecution in a timely manner. Additionally, victims should
maintain the ability to ask questions or express opinions if these
activities are directed at convicted defendants, and not the
accused, during the postverdict phase of the trial. It is important
that subjective statements by victims do not interfere with the
objective determination of innocence or guilt. The presumption
of innocence and rights afforded to the accused should not be
sacrificed. Rather, victim participation should focus on a
convicted defendant, and not on the accused.
Fairness considerations should trump any concerns about
the time that bifurcation might potentially add to the trial
proceedings. Notwithstanding, there might actually be time
savings involved with bifurcation. If the mixed tribunal acquits a
defendant, it will be relieved from expending time and energy
debating
and
determining
the
appropriate
sentence.
Additionally, the infusion of the victim's emotions into the
presentencing phase of the trial may constitute an additional
ground for appeal. By limiting active victim participation to the
sentencing stage of trial, bifurcation might provide the added
benefit of streamlined appellate challenges. Even if the
bifurcation process takes more time, however, it will protect the
interests and rights of the accused while still allowing the victims
to materially participate in the proceedings.
2.

New Pretrial Arrangement Process Should Not Unnecessarily
Limit the Trial Proceedings

When Japanese policymakers evaluate the progress of the lay
judge system in 2012, they also need to closely monitor and
analyze the effects of the mandatory "pretrial arrangement
procedures" recently implemented in advance of the lay judge
496
system.
Although it is too early to tell whether immediate change to
these pretrial procedures is necessary, Japan should look closely
at whether these procedures unnecessarily usurp relevant issues
and objective evidence from the mixed tribunal. Without
question, expeditious and efficient adjudication benefits all
496. See supra notes 266-68.
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parties involved in the criminal justice process. However, by overemphasizing speed and efficiency, defendants' rights might be
unreasonably endangered.
In theory, serious criminal cases tried by quasi-juries are
fairly straightforward and simple in comparison with complex
civil cases, particularly if guilt is uncontested and the primary
issue focuses on sentencing. In such cases, with the consent of
both sides, it may be possible to reasonably narrow down the
number of issues and streamline the evidence necessary for
presentation at trial. In contested cases, however, this may not be
the case. The issues might be more complex, and significant
conflicting evidence might exist. 497 In these complex cases, the
courts must refrain from unnecessarily eliminating issues and
evidence. The quasi-jury panel should be afforded the
opportunity to hear the evidence, observe witnesses, and make a
determination.
Worries about time should not trump a defendant's right to
a full and fair trial. Article 37(2) of the constitution of Japan
guarantees the full opportunity to examine all witnesses. 498 This is
a very important right for the defendant, and should not be
discounted in the name of speed. 499 Moreover, the evidentiary
process should not be unfairly truncated out of a desire to avoid
inconveniencing the citizenry. Ample time should be provided to
both sides to fully present evidence. If the evidence is
unnecessarily limited, it can deprive the citizen judges' of their
opportunity to assess witness credibility, despite the fact that this
is potentially one of their most important contributions to the
50 0
trial process.
CONCLUSION
Although the new lay judge system faces many obstacles,
Japan has created a vehicle capable of advancing society and
constructively improving its criminal justice. While many doubt
the new system, it does provide Japan with an opportunity to
restore credibility in the legal system through transparency, civic
497. See, e.g., Kamiya, supra note 293 (citizen judge in the first lay judge trial
expressed opinion that complicated cases with more witnesses will take longer).
498. KENPO [Constitution], art. 37.
499. See DANDO, supra note 128, at 281.
500. See Landsman & Zhang, supranote 19, at 191.
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participation, and education. It also provides an opportunity to
revise its interrogation process and implement measures
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of suspects and defendants.
Going forward, the operative question is whether Japan will
utilize the lay judge system as a vehicle of change or merely use it
as a showpiece. By adopting the suggestions contained in this
article, Japan can move in the right direction and bring the
system closer to realizing its potential.

